1		MS RICHARDS: I recall Mr Walshe. If I might outline the plan
2		for this morning. As we discussed yesterday afternoon,
3		Mr Walshe has a time constraint, he needs to leave by
4		11.30. There are a number of parties wishing to
5		cross-examine him so what I propose is I finish leading
6		Mr Walsh's evidence, the Commissioners may have questions
7		for Mr Walshe and at that point he be allowed to leave and
8		he has indicated he is available to come back on Monday for
9		cross-examination.
10		KIERAN WALSHE, recalled:
11		MS RICHARDS: Mr Walshe, at the end of yesterday we were talking
12		about communication issues that you had referred to in your
13		statement?---Yes.
14		You told us that you are a member of the State Emergency
15		Services Telecommunications and Technology
16		Committee?---That's correct.
17		I think you said you just joined that committee?---That's
18		correct.
19		Can I ask you if this is a correct description of the role of
20		that committee. Its role is to oversight the review and
21		implementation of multi agency emergency services
22		telecommunications and related technology including
23		SIPSAC?---That's correct.
24		SIPSAC is the Statewide Integrated Public Safety Communication
25		Strategy?---That's it, yes.
26		I will come back to what that is in a moment. The committee
27		also is to report and advise the Minister through the
28		Department of Justice briefing process?---That is correct.
29		I take it that is the Minister for Police and Emergency
30		Services?---It is, yes.
31		The committee is also to oversight the ongoing coordination and
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1		delivery of statewide integrated multi agency emergency
2		services telecommunication and technology?---Yes.
3		To report and to advise the Minister on future options?---Yes.
4		And to provide regular status reports on progress of SIPSAC
5		milestones?---Yes.
6		It is to consider and report to and advise the Minister through
7		the chairperson on any issue referred to it by the Minister
8		and establish any working groups necessary?---That's
9		correct.
10		The chair of that committee is Roslyn Kelleher, the executive
11		director of police and emergency services and corrections
12		division?---That's correct.
13		Within the Department of Justice. Who is the executive officer
14		of that committee?---The executive officer is Craig Lloyd,
15		I believe, who is in the major pyramid planning office at
16		Justice.
17		The other agencies represented on that committee are the CFA
18		through Mr Biddy?---Yes.
19		The Ambulance Victoria through Greg Sisala?---Yes.
20		Ken Larta from the Metropolitan Fire Brigade is there as
21		well?---Yes.
22		Mary Barry from Victoria SES?---Yes.
23		Peter Taylor from ESTA?---Yes.
24		We have Mr Waller from DSE and there are also representatives
25		from DHS, Treasury and Finance, Premier and Cabinet and the
26		Department of Justice and the Office of Emergency Services
27		Commissioner?---That's correct.
28		Moving to SIPSAC, I have found a description of SIPSAC as a
29		ten-year strategic vision and planning framework
30		established in 2001; is that correct?---That would be
31		correct, yes.
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1		It is to provide the focus coordination and mechanisms to
2		maintain and develop the state's emergency and public
3		safety communications capabilities?---Yes.
4		Someone coming fresh to this area, one might think that an
5		integrated radio communication system for emergency
6		services throughout Victoria would be the ultimate goal of
7		the SIPSAC process?---I would assume, yes.
8		We are eight years into a ten-year strategy, things don't look
9		to be going very well, do they?---There are contracts in
10		place both for metropolitan mobile radio and statewide
11		mobile radio. Those contracts come up for renewal and as I
12		mentioned yesterday, the SMR or the statewide mobile radio
13		contract comes up in 2012. There has to be some indication
14		given by the end of 2010 as to what the intention is with
15		that contract. As I said yesterday, in the ideal world we
16		would have one independent integrated radio network for the
17		state. Whether that is achievable at the end of the SMR
18		contract remains to be seen. The other options will be to
19		consider additional channels to be made available under the
20		SMR network to provide additional channels for police in
21		rural areas.
22		What are the constraints on achieving an integrated emergency
23		services communication system?---I would say that it is a
24		matter for government and it is government priority. It is
25		an extremely costly process to replace or to extend - say
26		to extend the metropolitan mobile radio network from out of
27		the metropolitan area into rural Victoria would be
28		extremely costly, so it is a matter of government priority
29		and what order it sits at government.
30		You are referring to the separate radio communications systems
31		within the Victoria Police?---Yes.
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1		I gather that there are separate systems that the CFA has?---The
2		CFA, on my understanding, operates on SMR to a degree. So
3		does the Department of Sustainability and Environment and
4		also Rural Ambulance, which was Rural Ambulance which is
5		now Ambulance Victoria but the rural sector of Ambulance
6		Victoria.
7		Ambulance Victoria has the same issue that the police
8		have?---Yes. The two networks.
9		That metropolitan ambulances cannot communicate with Rural
10		Ambulance?---That's correct.
11		Do you know and you may not, whether the CFA and the DSE radio
12		systems are compatible?---I can't answer that, no.
13		The road blocks or the constraints are cost. You have referred
14		to contractual arrangements that are currently in place for
15		the police?---No, that is the whole of government
16		contracts. These are not Victoria Police contracts, they
17		are whole of government contracts.
18		That is for the SMR network that is used by the police?---And
19		other agencies.
20		DSE, CFA and Rural Ambulance?---Yes and also for the
21		metropolitan radio as well, that is a whole of government
22		contract. They are not agency contracts, they are a whole
23		of government.
24		Who is the provider?---Telstra is the provider of SMR and I
25		believe Motorola, I think, is the provider of MMR.
26		MMR is the metropolitan digital system?---Metropolitan, yes.
27		If I can go back to an issue that we had set aside yesterday
28		which was the activities of the SERCC on 7 February. We
29		had a document that might have been sensitive but I am told
30		it is not and that we can distribute it and refer to it
31		without constraint. Have you seen this document
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1		before?---I have seen it, yes.
2		It is the first nine pages of a log maintained in the State
3		Emergency Response Coordination Centre commencing on 7
4		February?---Yes.
5		The log was in fact maintained well into March but what is
6		produced there is just the log for 7 February in the early
7		hours of 8 February?---Yes.
8		You said in evidence yesterday when I asked you what resources
9		the SERCC had been asked to procure and what it had done
10		that there had been a request for Metropolitan Fire Brigade
11		trucks to be allowed through?---Hume Highway, yes.
12		If you look at item 32 on the first page?---Yes.
13		That notes that request and what was done in response to that
14		request, does it not?---It does.
15		You also mentioned that there had been a request for
16		bulldozers?---Yes.
17		As far as I can see, there are three entries that are relevant
18		to this request for bulldozers. There was a request for
19		bulldozers to make a firebreak in the region of the
20		Reisdale fire?---I didn't hear that.
21		To construct a firebreak around the Reisdale fire?---I believe
22		so, yes.
23		If you could have a look at entries 152 which is on page 5 and
24		also 157 and 170 over the page?---Yes.
25		Reading those, this is what I draw from them and perhaps you
26		could tell me if I have got the right picture. There was a
27		request made at about 20 past 6 from Inspector Larchin of
28		Broadmeadows to behalf of Superintendent Bull who was the
29		divisional emergency response coordinator for the division
30		in which the Reisdale fire was burning?---In Bendigo, yes.
31		Requesting bulldozers to assist with land clearance?---Yes.
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1		At 6.35, contact was made with the Australian Defence Force
2		liaison officer and the request for bulldozers was passed
3		on to the Australian Defence Force?---Right.
4		The request was repeated at 7 o'clock, looking down at entry
5		170?---Yes.
6		The DERC at Bendigo, Superintendent Bull has exhausted all his
7		avenues for heavy-duty graders to assist with the Reisdale
8		fire. This request is for army resources or other state
9		resources as all other avenues in and around Bendigo have
10		been exhausted?---Yes.
11		The action at the bottom of that entry, Daly spoke to Singer who
12		confirmed the need for graders, not dozers and there was
13		still no answer from the ADF liaison officer regarding the
14		availability?---That's correct, that is what the entry
15		says.
16		If we go back to entry 152 on the right-hand side at 40 minutes
17		past 8, Senior Sergeant Daly spoke to I think someone who
18		advised that the operations had calmed considerably and
19		bulldozers were not longer required, they will make
20		inquiries with local contacts for road graders. ICC
21		advised of 72 hours notice to move by defence construction
22		company. I interpret that to mean that the defence
23		construction company needed 72 hours notice of a
24		requirement for earthmoving machinery?---I would interpret
25		that from what is detailed in the log there, yes.
26		So the request for bulldozers or graders was made at about 20
27		past 6. It was passed on to the ADF. It wasn't fulfilled
28		and the reason may have been that 72 hours notice hadn't
29		been given to the defence construction company to have the
30		earthmoving equipment available?---That may be the case.
31		As I say, that is the interpretation I take from the
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1		notation that is in the log. The other issue would be, of
2		course, is where are the defence assets and they may well
3		be interstate and not necessarily within Victoria.
4		Or they may just be at Puckapunyal?---They may be at
5		Puckapunyal, yes.
6		If I can go to two more examples, if you can go to entry 194 on
7		page 7?---Yes.
8		There is a request from Superintendent Billing?---He is at
9		region 4, division 4, Seymour.
10		There is a request for bedding for 350 people at the Wallan
11		multi purpose centre and for some fuel?---Yes.
12		That request was dealt with by involving the SES to supply
13		bedding?---Yes.
14		And arrangements for the supply of fuel?---That's correct.
15		That was all done quite properly. The last entry I would like
16		to take you to is on page 9, entry number 216?---I don't
17		have it. I stop at page 8.
18		216?---Yes.
19		That notes, does it not, a formal request for Australian
20		Government assistance having been made by the State
21		Emergency Response Coordinator in Victoria?---Yes.
22		That would be the Chief Commissioner who made the
23		request?---That would have been made on the chef
24		Commissioner's behalf by the State Emergency Response
25		Coordination Centre.
26		I think you told us yesterday that somebody was deputising for
27		him in the small hours of Sunday the 8th?---That's right.
28		That is the request for supply of 150 mattresses, portable beds
29		for emergency relief centres in the Baw Baw shire, people
30		who had been beanie evacuated from Neerim. It also notes
31		that the director general of EMA, the Emergency Management
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1		Authority had authorized the activation of
2		COMDISPLAN?---That is correct.
3		I tender that document, if I might.
4		HIS HONOUR: Do you want that treated as part of the previous
5		exhibit or separate?
6		MS RICHARDS: If I could ask for a separate exhibit number.
7		#EXHIBIT 21 - Log maintained at State Emergency Response
8		Coordination Centre
9		MS RICHARDS: If I can move to another topic. The topic of
10		roadblocks, I call them, you call them traffic management
11		points or TMPs?---Yes.
12		You have attached some guidelines to your statement as annexure
13		10 and for those using the hearing book, they are found
14		behind tab 16 at the very back, I think annexures 9 and 10
15		are both behind the same tab. These guidelines you outline
16		in your statement were developed by Victoria Police in
17		conjuction with the CFA and DSE in the context of an
18		inquest into the deaths of two people in the Grampians
19		fires in 2006?---That's correct.
20		Who had passed through a police roadblock returning to their
21		property and had died in the fires?---That's right.
22		There was an issue in the inquest as to whether s.31(3) of the
23		Country Fire Authority Act obliged police to allow people
24		who had a pecuniary interest in property behind the
25		roadblock to pass through the roadblock to return to their
26		property?---That is correct.
27		As I understand it, the Coroner, Mr Hore-Lacy, clarified that
28		there was no such obligation, people could not be required
29		to leave but nor were they able to return once they had
30		left and these guidelines were submitted as part of the
31		coronial inquest?---They were.
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1		And received the Coroner's approval and his reasons for
2		decision?---They did.
3		They havev now been reduced to a card that is distributed to
4		members who are manning roadblocks or staffing
5		roadblocks?---That is correct.
6		The guidelines are summarized rather pithily as, "If in doubt,
7		keep them out"?---I suppose that is a pretty basic summary,
8		yes.
9		That is what it says on the front cover of the
10		guidelines?---That's right.
11		If I can get a sense of when the guidelines applied. They are
12		described as guidelines for traffic management points
13		during wildfires so they apply when a fire is in the area,
14		when it is going and in the immediate aftermath of the
15		fire?---That is correct, they are only applicable to fires.
16		To go through the detail of how these guidelines operate, there
17		are two kinds of roadblocks that can be put in place under
18		these guidelines, one is partial, the other is
19		total?---That is correct.
20		A partial roadblock may be instigated by the incident controller
21		for the incident?---That is correct.
22		It is up to the incident controller who can pass through the
23		roadblock?---That's correct.
24		A total roadblock may be activated by a member of the police on
25		his or other own initiative?---Yes.
26		It may also be activated by the incident controller?---On the
27		request of the incident controller, yes.
28		Police on the roadblock have the discretion to upgrade a partial
29		road closure to a total road closure?---Yes, they do in the
30		instance of safety, if there are some safety issues that
31		arise they can do that.
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1		But not the reverse, they can't downgrade a total road closure
2		to a partial road closure?---No, they can't.
3		Is that a summary of how these guidelines work?---Yes.
4		They only work in relation to fires?---That's correct.
5		So when there is a fire approaching, during the fire, and in the
6		immediate aftermath of the fire. It follows that when
7		these guidelines apply, members of the police working in
8		accordance with guidelines have no discretion to allow
9		through people delivering relief to those behind the
10		roadblock?---Look, I think the guidelines do allow some
11		discretion but you can't be in a situation if somebody is
12		coming with relief that is necessary to prevent them
13		entering and the guidelines are there but they should never
14		take away the discretion of a member of Victoria Police to
15		act in a situation where it is quite proper to allow access
16		for a specific purpose.
17		If the guidelines have been interpreted on the ground by members
18		as requiring them to keep out everybody, including those
19		delivering relief or crews wanting to restore essential
20		services, for example, then the guidelines may need some
21		refinement?---But it is also the case if - people would be
22		told that if in doubt, ask. So if they are in doubt at the
23		traffic management points they should seek advice from
24		someone in authority back at the police forward command
25		post or the police operations centre.
26		That would be the police command of chain not the incident
27		controller?---No, and what you would find would be, then,
28		in that circumstance, there would be some discussion with
29		the incident controller about these people needing to get
30		through and the members are asking to be able to allow them
31		through. That is the way that it has happened and I know
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1		that it did happen at one stage around the traffic
2		management point on the Whittlesea-Kinglake Road, there was
3		some discussion about allowing people through.
4		These guidelines may also have prevented family members being
5		reunited after the fires?---That's right.
6		Where one member of the household had stayed to defend the
7		house?---Yes.
8		And another member had perhaps taken the children to safety.
9		What discretion is available for members on roadblocks to
10		allow people to return to their properties?---My
11		understanding is that whilst it was a total road closure in
12		those circumstances, no person was allowed through.
13		What about people who had remained within an area affected by
14		fire and wished to leave to obtain supplies, food, water,
15		fuel?---Whilst it was a total road closure they informed
16		they traffic management point that if they went past the
17		traffic management point they would not be permitted back.
18		COMMISSIONER McLEOD: Do you believe that is a reasonable policy
19		in those circumstances?---It is a policy that has
20		considerable difficulty with it in that sense. If you look
21		at, again, if I refer to the road closure in the
22		Whittlesea-Kinglake Road where people who were up in
23		Kinglake on the mountain who came down to the traffic
24		managment point they were provided that advice and did a
25		U-turn and went back up. People who were residents of
26		Kinglake but were down at Whittlesea would come to the
27		traffic management point and they would be turned around
28		and denied access. So there were some anomaly there in
29		relation to that. But that is in the relation to the stay
30		and go policy. The stay and go policy allows people to
31		stay if they choose to do so. The full road closure is to
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1		prevent people going in so if they go out they can't go
2		back.
3		I understand that but it is a discretionary aspect of the
4		policy, isn't it?---Well, it is the way that the policy was
5		intended that if it is a full road closure nobody goes past
6		it unless they meet the criteria in the guidelines for
7		people who are permitted to go past.
8		I guess that is the import of my question, is it a reasonable
9		policy in the circumstances that have been
10		described?---Quite clearly when you look at what has
11		occurred during these fires and you look at the
12		circumstances that existed, clearly, the policy does need
13		some or the guidelines do need some refinement. They do
14		need some further consideration because of those anomalies
15		that I mentioned, that it does seem that it is a situation
16		that does not provide equity to all residents in those
17		circumstances.
18		CHAIRMAN: Can I just follow that through. At the Committee of
19		Consultations, for example, probably, a substantial number
20		of people praised the police but when it came to the
21		roadblocks or the traffic management points, there was so
22		many criticisms. What would be the best way to go about
23		having a change in the guidelines to accommodate what
24		seemed to be the reasonable needs of people in those areas?
25		That is the sort of preliminary question but you mentioned
26		the question of a kind of appeal against the decision going
27		to the control centre or the forward comand post, are they
28		realistic possibilities, for example, to accommodate the
29		problems? Expand generally on those matters?---They are
30		realistic possibilities to build into the guidelines. What
31		I think is necessary is for the relevant agencies, that is
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1		Victoria Police, VicRoads, Country Fire Authority,
2		Department of Sustainability and Environment, to have a
3		further review of the guidelines and I think it would be
4		appropriate that some community consultation is undertaken
5		with people who have been subject to the limitations of the
6		guidelines to get some understanding of their concerns and
7		maybe some input from them as to how they think, having
8		experienced the limitations, how they think it might work
9		better in the future.
10		For example wrist bands were used in later circumstances, is it
11		possible that some forth of wrist band attachment could be
12		made as a temporary form of enabling people who are at
13		least borderline in relation to providing relief or getting
14		out but wanting to come back in could be accommodated?---I
15		am certain that that sort of activity or that sort of
16		strategy could be put in place. Certainly when the road
17		closures became partial road closures wrist bands were used
18		for residents, to identify residents, to allow them to go
19		up so I think there is opportunity to look at it in a
20		broader sense as to how the traffic management points could
21		be managed in a better manner. It is difficult for our
22		people. We have had people assaulted; people almost run
23		over; we have people now subject to civil litigation
24		relative to the operation of traffic management points so I
25		think clearly there is opportunity for us to look at it in
26		a different sense.
27		There seemed to be - I am going on the general indications given
28		at community consultations, in some places, people who are
29		locals who chose to work out different ways of getting to
30		where they needed to go, got the knock back there but then
31		they found their way in to where they were not supposed to
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1		be anyway and there were also complaints at times of media
2		people knowing the other ways in were able to get in and
3		potential looters also. So there were difficulties for a
4		variety of different factors and these are all the sorts of
5		thing that you, I take it, want to take into account if the
6		guidelines are to be revisited?---Certainly people with a
7		local knowledge had an opportunity to circumvent what was
8		being endeavoured to be undertaken through the traffic
9		management points and we did have issues with media getting
10		in vehicles with residents and getting access by getting in
11		vehicles and going out with residents, so there is a
12		multitude of issues that really do need to be addressed in
13		this matter.
14		COMMISSIONER PASCOE: Yes, Mr Walshe, you can see that this was
15		an issued that occurred quite frequently during our
16		community consultations and I think it would be fair to say
17		that the positive attributes of the roadblocks were seen to
18		be the police preventing looters, the police preventing
19		tourists who were getting in the way with recovery or even
20		fire suppression, and the police attending to the safety of
21		local community members; so I think it is fair to say that
22		by and large people understood the difficult situation in
23		which the police found themselves. However, they also in
24		many places experienced an inflexibility sometimes because
25		the local police were not staffing the roadblock; they were
26		police from elsewhere?---That is correct, yes.
27		Unable perhaps to exercise discretion, so in the review it may
28		be worth considering where those roadblocks can be staffed
29		by police or other emergency services workers who have a
30		local knowledge and know local people. But, look, I wanted
31		to ask you, in relation to the declaration of either a full
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1		or a partial roadblock, was there any experience on
2		7 February of either confusion or conflict in the
3		declaration of what might be regarded as a partial as
4		distinct from a full roadblock?---My understanding on
5		7 February there were no partial road closures. They were
6		all full road closures because of the fire activity that
7		was present across the state or across those fire grounds.
8		If I could just make a comment about your comment
9		about local people, one of the difficulties we experience
10		is, particularly in this set of circumstances, we had a
11		large number of traffic management points right across all
12		those fire grounds. It is just not possible in those
13		circumstances to have them staffed by local police. What
14		we were endeavouring to do as the response activity moved
15		on was to get the local police back into their local
16		communities to work with the local communities and leave
17		the traffic management points to other police. And
18		unfortunately that is the case and we just felt that it was
19		far more important to have the local police back with their
20		local communities where they have the great connection with
21		them.
22		MS RICHARDS: Mr Walshe, I should clarify, at a point after the
23		fires had died down, the roadblocks stopped being
24		maintained in accordance with the guidelines, but a number
25		of them continued to be maintained by police for other
26		reasons, did they not?---That is correct, yes.
27		Because there were crime scenes being investigated?---Yes, there
28		were.
29		Because the Coroner had placed an order over an area under s.40
30		of the Coroners Act?---That is correct.
31		And also for road safety reasons where VicRoads had advised that
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1		a road was simply unsafe?---VicRoads and also
2		municipalities.
3		Was it at that point that the wristband system that was in place
4		in some communities was introduced?---That is right. As we
5		became to a partial road closure, the opportunity to
6		introduce the wristband system was there and that's what we
7		did at that point in time. It enabled residents to go in,
8		but the residents were given quite clearly some advice and
9		guidance as to what they should and shouldn't do around
10		their properties and we were able to then manage the
11		residents, but we kept the other, the general public, so to
12		speak, out.
13		So the residents were given hospital wristbands?---Yes, they
14		were, yeah.
15		And how did police on the roadblocks go about ascertaining who
16		was a resident and who should be - - - ?---To get a
17		wristband, they had to demonstrate or prove that they were
18		residents of that locality and having done that, they were
19		issued with a wristband. Then, as they approached a
20		traffic management point, the vehicle would be stopped by
21		the police at the traffic management point and they would
22		show their wristband and then they would be granted access.
23		What kind of proof was required, given that a number of these
24		people were away from their homes and a number of them had
25		just lost all of their possessions in the fire?---Look, I
26		think it was reasonable proof that people, you know, do
27		have drivers licences and if they gave their name and
28		address, a drivers licence check could be undertaken just
29		to substantiate it. It wasn't intrusive, but it was
30		necessary to make sure that we were providing access to
31		residents or people who had a genuine right to be there.
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1		Again, people with pecuniary interests also were permitted
2		to go up there as well.
3		In your statement, just for reference, you have given an
4		overview of roadblocks that were put in place in response
5		to a number of fires, the fires at Churchill, Kilmore East,
6		Kinglake and Murrindindi, Bunyip State Park and at
7		Bendigo?---Yes.
8		You don't claim that that is an exhaustive list?---No, it is
9		certainly by no means an exhaustive list.
10		There is still an information collection process under way, is
11		there, to establish when and where roadblocks were
12		established?---That is correct.
13		Just a couple more matters, Mr Walshe. In para.4 of your
14		statement you refer to an information collection process
15		that Victoria Police is currently undertaking directed to a
16		number of ends: the disaster victim identification
17		process, preparation of briefs for the Coroner, criminal
18		investigations and also as part of an internal process of
19		inquiry and review into the emergency response of Victoria
20		Police. Could you expand on that last process that is
21		being undertaken?---The internal?
22		Yes?---Like any police operation, there is a series of debriefs
23		that is undertaken at the completion. Those debriefs have
24		been undertaken in local areas, the geographical areas
25		where the fires occurred, in areas where there was a police
26		operations centre or a forward command post, and also we
27		have had a general overall debrief at sort of a higher
28		level across the organisation. Now, all that documentation
29		is being prepared and being submitted and then collated.
30		The idea of debriefs is to identify the learnings, to
31		identify the deficiencies and then to be in a position to
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1		take action to rectify the deficiencies where it is
2		possible to do so and to also take account of the learnings
3		to see what improvements we can make within Victoria Police
4		with regards to our response, with regards to the training
5		that may be more appropriate for other people in the
6		organisation that they might not have been exposed to.
7		Can I ask, has that process of internal review addressed issues
8		of traffic management points?---It certainly has.
9		Has it addressed issues of radio communications within the
10		Victoria Police and between emergency services?---When I
11		say addressed, it has raised issues. The issues haven't
12		yet been addressed but the issues have been raised in the
13		debrief processes.
14		And has the issue of the effectiveness of the structures under
15		the state emergency response plan also been raised in this
16		debrief?---In some sense, yes.
17		What is the expected output of the internal review, of paper or
18		a report?---Within Victoria Police we operate a Critical
19		Incident Management Review Committee which I chair. The
20		purpose of that committee is to review police response to
21		critical incidents. The terms of reference for that
22		committee is police response to critical incidents such as
23		fatal or non-fatal police shootings, fatal or non-fatal
24		police pursuits, deaths in custody and any other matter
25		that the chief commissioner requests the committee to look
26		at. What we do in that particular process, we will have a
27		review done, there will be issues identified. Those issues
28		then come to that committee. They inform of
29		recommendations. They are then ...
30		So there is some kind of report that is presented to the
31		committee?---Yes. They are logged then in a
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1		recommendations database and then the committee actually
2		allocates them out to relevant areas of Victoria Police for
3		action. What is intended to do with all the issues coming
4		out of the debriefs is that they are being categorised into
5		groups. Now, whether it is communications or traffic
6		management points or whatever, they are all being - all the
7		issues are being categorised. Once that categorisation is
8		completed, they will come to the Critical Incident
9		Management Review Committee and they will be managed in the
10		same process as we do for any other incident. Again, they
11		will be recorded on the database, they will be allocated
12		out across the organisation for action with time lines for
13		completion and reporting back to the Critical Incident
14		Management Review Committee.
15		What is the time line for that report to go to the Critical
16		Incident Management Review Committee?---I am hoping that we
17		are in a position ... we have a meeting scheduled for
18		28 May and I am hoping that from an organisation
19		perspective we are in a position to present the first draft
20		of that particular document or that list to the committee
21		on that day so that we can start the process. Some of the
22		issues will need to be addressed clearly before the next
23		fire season so, you know, time is relatively tight for us
24		to do that. So that's my expectation, 28 May.
25		Mr Walshe, can you ensure that the report that is made available
26		to the Critical Incident Management Review Committee is
27		also made available to this Royal Commission?---I certainly
28		will.
29		Together with any decisions made by the committee?---Yes.
30		And can you ensure that that happens shortly after the report is
31		delivered?---I certainly will, yes.
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1		Just one last matter, Mr Walshe, the events of 7 February had a
2		much more personal dimension for you than any of the
3		matters that we have been discussing today, did they
4		not?---They did.
5		You are aware, I understand, that Denis Spooner gave evidence
6		here last Friday?---He did, yes.
7		About what happened to his family on that day that ended in the
8		deaths of his wife, Marilyn, and his son, Damien. He
9		mentioned during his evidence his other son, Warwick, who
10		he was in communication with during the day. Warwick is
11		your son-in-law; is that right?---That is correct, yes.
12		It was one of the things you had to do immediately after the
13		fire, to tell Mr Spooner of the deaths of his wife and
14		son?---Correct.
15		Thank you for your evidence, Mr Walshe. If the Commissioners
16		have questions, now would be a good time.
17		CHAIRMAN: I think the answer is yes, but in terms of timing,
18		how much longer can you afford now as distinct from some
19		other time?---Mr Chair, I am available - - -
20		Until when?---11.30.
21		The review process that you referred to, the internal review,
22		may well cover some of these things, but, for example, the
23		matter of SEWS, would that be one of the sort of things
24		that would be on the agenda for the internal
25		review?---That's a matter that we would need to undertake
26		some discussion and some review with the office of the
27		emergency services commissioner, together with the fire
28		agencies as to the application of SEWS. Whether the
29		application of SEWS will be relevant into the future,
30		having regard to the COAG decision with regards to an early
31		warning system, I am unsure. I would need to seek some
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1		advice on that.
2		Again, going back to the community consultations, a lot of local
3		residents, if you like, complained that having been told in
4		newspapers and other ways that they should be pulling the
5		blinds down, watching the television and in effect staying
6		where they were, indicated that that is precisely what they
7		were doing and it would have been highly desirable for the
8		television stations to give some kind of indication that
9		there was a major crisis occurring. Would a request for
10		SEWS be the best way of seeing that achieved?---SEWS is one
11		option. Another option, of course, is to make direct
12		contact through our media unit to the relevant television
13		stations. Another way, of course, is a banner notification
14		running across the bottom of the television set, you know,
15		which could inform people. So there is the two options
16		there that I think where television could be used in that
17		sense.
18		And, again, your internal review process may be, in effect, the
19		quickest way that the possibility so far as that is
20		concerned could be examined?---We can examine that, yes,
21		because that is an issue that certainly has arisen, the
22		issue around notification, and it is a matter that we would
23		need to deal with, as I said before, in conjunction with
24		the office of the emergency services commissioner and the
25		fire services and we will undertake that.
26		Another matter that is related to that is just generally the
27		notion of warnings to the public in one way or another and
28		you have indicated that no request was made to you that
29		there be that kind of warning. Would again that be the
30		sort of matter that would be the subject of the internal
31		review, whether there were better ways of the police
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1		exercising their role of giving appropriate warnings to the
2		public rather than just waiting to be notified that there
3		had been a request for such warnings to be given in
4		whatever other ways were possible?---Yes. Look, the
5		minister in his role as the coordinator-in-chief has
6		written to the chief commissioner and has requested that
7		the chief commissioner initiate a review of part (iii) of
8		the emergency management manual, which is the state
9		emergency response plan. That review has commenced and
10		that will bring together all the relevant agencies with
11		regards to a response to an emergency and to review the
12		manual. One of the issues that will need to be looked at
13		will be the issue of warnings.
14		What about the role, then, of this strategic group that was
15		referred to which has not an operational role but a
16		capacity to be on the spot and to make suggestions that
17		might include that SEWS be activated or that there be
18		better kinds of warning to the public; is that the sort of
19		thing that also ought to be the subject of the review?---It
20		will need to be. When we look at - even the establishment
21		and now the existence of the Integrated Emergency
22		Coordination Centre, the State Emergency Strategy Team and
23		the Emergency Management Joint Public Information
24		Committee, they are not currently detailed as a part of the
25		state emergency response plan. They will need to be
26		incorporated into the plan and their roles and functions
27		will need to be detailed and articulated in the plan and
28		that will be done as part of the review of the plan.
29		Can I move to an area that is still related but does go into a
30		different area, that's the matter of evacuations, voluntary
31		and otherwise. Would the process of evacuation, for
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1		example, that you referred to in Marysville be the subject
2		of a review because it seems to me - you are asking
3		yourself what am I getting at - it seems to me there was a
4		possibility of real danger associated with that voluntary
5		evacuation. If a tree had come across the road
6		potentially, a lot of people who are simply following the
7		police advice which was good advice in all the
8		circumstances - but if the road had been blocked, the
9		police were potentially responsible or might have been seen
10		to be responsible for the deaths of an awful lot of people
11		who followed the police lead in the course of that late
12		evacuation. Now, are the possibilities for and against
13		that kind of situation likely to be the subject of
14		review?---It is something that will have to be considered
15		in terms of a risk analysis or risk matrix format, some of
16		the things that will need to be taken into consideration by
17		our members who take action in the field; when they see
18		danger, what they should consider before they actually take
19		decisions about what action they are actually going to put
20		in place.
21		Because you referred earlier in relation to what I choose to
22		call the roadblocks, there is a discretion for doing the
23		right thing in the circumstances rather than applying a
24		fixed rule. The application of the fixed rule in relation
25		to Marysville, if there had been one, that there won't be
26		any evacuations, was lightened by the fact that they had a
27		discretion to take it upon themselves to take them out.
28		That's again one of those sort of issues that would be
29		reviewed as to the good and the bad?---Yes, it will be. It
30		is a matter of their obligation, their duty of care, that
31		they make these decisions and they take these decisions
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1		based on what they understand and believe exist at that
2		point in time. But certainly it is a matter that we would
3		need to look at in a risk management sense because there
4		are inherent risks in some of those particular activities,
5		not only to the public but also to the members themselves.
6		COMMISSIONER MCLEOD: Would your police officers in that
7		situation be well aware of the detail of the "stay and go"
8		policy?---Oh yes, they would well and truly be aware of
9		that and they would know that there are people who will
10		make the decision to stay and not go. All they can do is
11		to provide advice as to what the danger is that they
12		understand exists at the time and leave it up to the
13		individuals to make their own decision as to whether they
14		are going to go or not.
15		I suppose the area of the policy that I am particularly
16		referring to is the very clear indication in that policy
17		that it is a most dangerous thing to seek to leave the fire
18		ground late in the piece?---That is correct. Late in the
19		piece. Of course, if you leave too late while the fire is
20		too close to you, then there is the opportunity, I suppose,
21		that you can be caught in the fire if you go in the wrong
22		direction. But again, you know, the police at that point
23		in time made a judgment decision based on what they knew or
24		believed to be the circumstances and believed that they had
25		the opportunity to get people away and they took that
26		action.
27		Would they have had in their possession information or knowledge
28		that people in Marysville generally didn't have available
29		to them?---I don't believe they did. Senior Constable
30		Hamill stated that he actually went to the CFA area at
31		Marysville and got some advice before they actually did
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1		move the people. He was aware that the Buxton Road was
2		clear, was open, and that was the way out.
3		Thank you.
4		CHAIRMAN: You have mentioned two senior police, I think it is
5		Fontana and Collins, who were at the IECC. Is it
6		contemplated that they would be giving evidence or is it a
7		matter outside your control?---I believe it is most likely
8		that they will be giving evidence, yes.
9		COMMISSIONER PASCOE: Deputy Commissioner Walshe, I have got a
10		couple of questions that relate to the operational
11		structures on the day including those that you relate to
12		the document that you provided us with yesterday which was
13		annexure 6 (or an elaboration of it) and that contained in
14		annexure 7. In annexure 7 you have provided us with
15		guidelines developed by Victoria Police, the CFA and the
16		DSE in consultation with the Metropolitan Fire Board and
17		the State Emergency Services about the operation of the
18		State Emergency Response Coordination Centre and the
19		Integrated Emergency Coordination Centre for the 2009 fire
20		season.
21		Now that you have had the benefit of at least a
22		partial review, I suppose the query is, would you be
23		looking at the effectiveness of retaining dual sites during
24		a wildfire? I imagine issues such as the degree of liaison
25		that occurred between the two sites and whether in a future
26		event like that you might move to a single site for the
27		coordination of the response?---I think if we look at it in
28		the sense that the Integrated Emergency Coordination Centre
29		was there to manage the fires, the response to the fires by
30		the fire services. So the coordination role there was
31		coordination of fire resources and strategy to deal with
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1		the fires. The State Emergency Response Coordination
2		Centre has a different role, and the role there is really
3		to support the chief commissioner, who was the state
4		coordinator, and to address issues of provision of
5		resources, gathering intelligence which is spread across
6		the agencies, and allocating resources in terms of
7		priority, making requests to the commonwealth for
8		resources. What clearly needs to be undertaken in the
9		review of the emergency management manual at chapter 3 is
10		the role and some clarity, defined clarity, about the role
11		of these two facilities. In my view, I don't see that they
12		would be combined because one is there to deal with and
13		combat the fires; the other is there to deal with and
14		provide the support for the coordination of resources and
15		activities relative to support of the agencies fighting the
16		fires. So, again, as I said before, the Integrated
17		Emergency Coordination Centre is an issue that came out of
18		previous fires where it was felt that the fire services,
19		the CFA and the DSE, could work better if they were
20		co-located in that facility; and it has, it has proven that
21		they were able to work closer and their coordination
22		between the two agencies is far better, but there is some
23		clarity that needs to be taken and it will be undertaken
24		during the review of the manual.
25		Thank you. I want to communicate to you a perception that we
26		heard during a number of our community consultations and I
27		stress that I think it is a perception, but it was that
28		there was no one in control on the day. So again I suppose
29		it is something for consideration during the review that
30		you are undertaking because if I look at the diagram that
31		you provided us as well, we have across this phase of the
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1		diagram I suppose an effect of - you are representing here
2		a high level of coordination and then at the next level
3		above where we have effectively a range of organisations.
4		There is not a clarity there about the command function or
5		the control function. I know that you have described to us
6		that the control of individual incidents happens at the
7		local level, but I suppose the question is: when you
8		encounter an emergency of let's call it a megafire, but a
9		day like 7 February where you had hundreds of fires, the
10		level of escalation and the appropriateness of the
11		escalation up to the state level, is that something that
12		you will be looking at, because it certainly is something
13		that wasn't well understood out in the community, that
14		there was a clear, if you like, line of command and a clear
15		coordination of the fires on the day?---Clearly under the
16		arrangements the fire services are in control. They are
17		the control agency and it is their responsibility to deal
18		with the fires. They did have their incident control
19		centres across the fire grounds and they had their
20		Integrated Emergency Coordination Centre where they had
21		their centralised control. With regard to the police
22		operation, we had people in charge of the relative police
23		operations for the relative fire areas, and reports and
24		advice was coming back into the police operations centre
25		from those areas as to the activities that were being
26		undertaken.
27		Thank you. Now I have got a couple more questions.
28		COMMISSIONER MCLEOD: Just on that point, if we take the
29		question of advice to the community as an example, under
30		the arrangements that you have been describing, who would
31		you see as ultimately responsible for the nature of the
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1		advice being provided to the community during the course of
2		the emergency?---Well, there has to be - it has to initiate
3		from the control agency because the control agency have the
4		expertise with regards to fire behaviour, fire direction,
5		weather implications, so it has to initiate there. And
6		then what happened on the 7th was that the control agency,
7		the fire services, were providing that information direct
8		to ABC Radio. Also, as I did give in evidence, there is
9		the Emergency Management Joint Public Information Committee
10		which was responsible to put out public information
11		relative to traffic management points, reminders to the
12		community about exercising or implementing their fire
13		plans, making their decision whether they are going to stay
14		or go, that sort of activity; but in terms of what is
15		happening with regards to the fires and where the fires are
16		going, it must originate from the control agency.
17		And yet I think we heard earlier in our hearings from the fire
18		agencies who didn't believe they had a statutory
19		responsibility to keep the community informed in the course
20		of their dealing with the fires?---I understand that is
21		correct, there is no statutory responsibility. The issues
22		around those sorts of things are in the manual. The manual
23		is not legislation. There is nothing in the Emergency
24		Management Act that actually gives any statutory obligation
25		for that activity.
26		But there do appear to be structures above the level of the
27		incident controllers with a responsibility for coordinating
28		information being provided to the community. Now, what
29		role did those bodies play?---I'm unable to answer that.
30		But, as I said, it clearly has to originate from the
31		control agency. You know, they know or they should be
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1		aware of what is occurring with regards to the fires and
2		they are the ones who are in the position to give that
3		advice. Victoria Police can't because we are not fire
4		behaviourist specialists.
5		Would it be fair to assume, then, from what you say that there
6		was divided responsibility for the provision of information
7		to the community during the course of the fires?---Well,
8		clearly that the information needs to come from the control
9		agency and then it can be distributed via the Emergency
10		Management Joint Public Information Committee or it could
11		have been distributed, as it was, direct to ABC Radio.
12		And the police were giving some advice to the public sources of
13		information?---Only through our role in the Emergency
14		Management Joint Public Information Committee, which was
15		being chaired on that day by Superintendent Ross McNeill.
16		So would that be seen to be the senior coordinating point for
17		provision of information to the committee?---That's the
18		role that that committee plays within the emergency
19		management. That is their responsibility, for the
20		dissemination of messages, not the creation of the
21		messages. I mean the initiation has to come from the
22		control agency.
23		Thank you.
24		CHAIRMAN: So it is essential that the information be timely and
25		accurate, and insofar as there are many of the police
26		members who are providing that information, your
27		anticipation would be that they would provide it to the
28		public information officer and that information then,
29		assuming it is accurate, is provided in a timely way to the
30		websites and the ABC so that the public should be able to
31		rely upon the information they get either on the internet
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1		or on the ABC for that kind of information that they need
2		to make their decisions?---That's the intent, yes.
3		COMMISSIONER PASCOE: Just in relation to the Australia
4		Interagency Incident Management System, the incident
5		control system part of that, I note that Victoria Police
6		are monitoring the Western Australia police use of that
7		system so I am just wondering is it with a view to the
8		possible adoption in the future and, secondly, are there
9		problems having two different incident control systems
10		operating within the State of Victoria?---Firstly - I will
11		answer the second one first - no, I don't see that there
12		is. I mean to say it is well established within the police
13		agencies across Australia as to the structures and the
14		terminology and it is now well established within the fire
15		services as to their structure and terminology. What we
16		are investigating or looking at is a web-based system for
17		logging and managing an emergency. It is an IT-based
18		system, but it is operated off the web. It is being used
19		by Western Australia and it is being used across Western
20		Australia. My advice is - I haven't seen it, but my advice
21		is that it works quite effectively. We have actually had,
22		I think it is up to three or four now, senior members of
23		the Victoria Police who have been over to undertake some
24		training to get some understanding of the viability for us
25		in Victoria.
26		Thank you.
27		CHAIRMAN: Would you suggest that we should endeavour to get
28		evidence taken from an expert familiar with that system so
29		that we can have a better idea of how it operates and
30		whether it is transferable?---If that is of value to the
31		Commission, sir, I would suggest that that would probably
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1		be a viable option.
2		COMMISSIONER PASCOE: Just finally, I note in your statement
3		that this is in relation to the municipal emergency
4		response plan (and I will just find it again), but I note
5		that the municipalities are required to have emergency
6		response plans. One of the interesting elements of our
7		community consultations was that there was only one
8		location where people volunteered knowledge of their
9		municipal plan, so the question is: are municipalities
10		required to communicate the plan to local people; and,
11		secondly, in their oversight of the plans, do Victoria
12		Police, if you like, audit the adequacy of those emergency
13		response plans?---No. The audit function of that is
14		clearly defined as being the State Emergency Service. It
15		is their responsibility to audit municipal plans and my
16		understanding is that they do that. How the municipalities
17		actually communicate to the residents or the community the
18		elements of the plan is a matter that rests with the
19		municipality, so I can't answer what the municipality does
20		in that sense, but certainly with regards to the audit, it
21		is the responsibility of the State Emergency Service.
22		Thank you.
23		CHAIRMAN: Do you want to ask any questions arising out of our
24		questions?
25		MS RICHARDS: No questions from Mr Walshe. Mr Walshe, we will
26		see you again at 9.30 on Monday.
27		CHAIRMAN: I had an idea that other people given the opportunity
28		would take it to ask questions now.
29		MS RICHARDS: Mr Livermore has a couple of questions. The
30		understanding that I have reached with counsel for the
31		parties who wish to cross-examine Mr Walshe is that they
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1		will do that in one go on Monday.
2		CHAIRMAN: Is everyone content with that process?
3		MS RICHARDS: Apart from Mr Livermore's questions.
4		MR LIVERMORE: I have just got a couple arising so we might as
5		well get those out of the way.
6		CHAIRMAN: Yes, by all means.
7		CROSS-EXAMINED BY MR LIVERMORE:
8		Mr Walshe, just in relation to the provision of information or
9		warnings to the community during the course of a fire, if I
10		can suggest to you the way that it works under the AIIMS
11		system that is operated by the fire agencies is that an
12		incident control centre is established; is that
13		right?---That is correct, yes.
14		There is an incident controller appointed?---Yes, there is.
15		And that incident controller, in the case of 7 February fires,
16		would be either a DSE or CFA member?---That is correct,
17		depending on the locality of the fire.
18		There is then a structure underneath that incident controller
19		which contains an information unit?---Yes.
20		And again that will be either a CFA or DSE officer?---Yes.
21		It is the job of the information unit and the information
22		officer to provide recommendations for the provision of
23		information or warnings to the public to the incident
24		controller?---That's my understanding, yes.
25		When such information or warnings are approved, they then from a
26		practical sense go out, as you have described, directly to
27		the ABC website bushfire information line?---That is
28		correct.
29		And Victoria Police, from a practical point of view, has no
30		contact with the provision of that information and
31		warning?---Not necessarily. In the case of fires, not
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33		Bushfires Royal Commission
1		necessarily, no.
2		But also, the incident controller, whose job it is to manage the
3		incident, may from time to time request Victoria Police to
4		provide information or warnings of a particular context and
5		content determined by the incident controller?---That is
6		correct; and that is the process if the SEWS was going to
7		be used, yes.
8		CHAIRMAN: Can I just check on that. The approval that is given
9		to the information officer is given by the incident
10		controller, I take it, so that is why ... the information
11		officer prepares something, but before that goes out, it
12		must be checked by the incident controller?---That is my
13		understanding.
14		It doesn't have to be referred centrally; so the question of
15		whether there is a comprehensive set of information coming
16		where there are multiple fires is nobody's responsibility,
17		it is really a matter of the local incident controller
18		having an information officer and what those two choose to
19		provide to the ABC is treated as being all
20		important?---Well, I can't answer that.
21		It is just that they arose out of Mr Livermore's questions.
22		MR LIVERMORE: I was about to move on to the central aspects,
23		sir.
24		CHAIRMAN: Very well.
25		MR LIVERMORE: Also within the IECC there is a state coordinator
26		who is an officer of one of the fire agencies?---Yes.
27		And there is an information unit within the IECC?---Yes, there
28		is.
29		And that information unit within the IECC, which is overlooking
30		the response in relation to all the fires going on in
31		Victoria, may from time to time issue its own information
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1		releases or warnings?---That is my understanding.
2		We have heard and seen transcripts here of DSE officers and CFA
3		officers within the IECC conducting interviews with the
4		ABC, 3AW and other media agencies during the course of the
5		fire; were you aware that that was going on as well?---Yes,
6		I saw them. I saw those interviews, yes. In fact, I
7		participated in some of those interviews as well.
8		Thank you.
9		CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr Livermore. Well, we now farewell you
10		until next Monday morning.
11		MS RICHARDS: Just a couple of things. I am informed by counsel
12		for the Commonwealth that she has 15 minutes of
13		cross-examination, then that would be it for Mr Walshe.
14		Would it be convenient to do that now?
15		CHAIRMAN: And she is going to be estopped from having a further
16		opportunity. Very well. I think we might proceed.
17		MS RICHARDS: Perhaps before that occurs, there was an issue
18		raised in Mr Walshe's evidence in answer to questions from
19		the Commissioners that brought to light for the first time
20		that the Minister for Police and Emergency Services has
21		requested a review be undertaken of part (iii) of the
22		emergency management manual and has done that by letter. I
23		call for the production of that letter to this Commission
24		today by the state.
25		MR LIVERMORE: We hear that, sir.
26		CHAIRMAN: You have heard what was said. Yes, thank you. Yes,
27		Ms McLeod.
28		CROSS-EXAMINED BY MS McLEOD:
29		Mr Walshe, I was going to ask you some questions of
30		clarification from this document that we have been provided
31		with, the police log, which I am having difficulty reading
32		(7) 708 WALSHE XXN
33		Bushfires Royal Commission
1		I have to say so please bear with me. There is an
2		indication on 7 February at 2338 that there was contact by
3		Mr Greg Lovell, Director of EMA Planning and Coordination,
4		who offered a member to act as an EMA liaison officer?---I
5		haven't got the log.
6		It is 207?---207?
7		207?---Yes, I have got that, yes.
8		So the contact was initiated by the Commonwealth on the evening
9		of 7 February you will see in that item 207?---Yes.
10		At 2338. And then on the following page at 216 ... ?---I don't
11		have 216, I'm sorry.
12		Page 9. The log records at 216 at 6.23 am on 8 February, the
13		Sunday, a formal request for Australian Government
14		assistance has been made by the State Emergency Response
15		Coordinator in Victoria, that's the chief
16		commissioner?---Yes.
17		Do you actually know whether that was made by Mr Collins as the
18		officer or by the coordinator?---I can't answer that.
19		And that was the first request for mattresses and bedding and so
20		on as noted in that entry?---That is correct. There was
21		reference earlier to a request for that coming from the
22		field.
23		Just to clarify the position, the provision of defence aid to
24		the civil community, there are three levels of defence aid
25		provided to the civil community known as DAC 1, DAC 2 and
26		DAC 3; you are familiar with that?---Yes.
27		And DAC 1 is a local area of request that go directly from the
28		local police commander to the local military base, for
29		example?---That is correct.
30		Those DAC 1 levels (including - I think you have referred to an
31		early bulldozer request) don't activate the COMDISPLAN, do
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1		they?---No, they don't.
2		They contemplate a rapid turnover such as a 24-hour turnover and
3		they are initiated by the local commander's own request and
4		dealt with that way?---That's correct.
5		There is another level, which is DAC 2, and then there is DAC 3,
6		both of which initiate a request to the emergency services
7		of the Australian Government?---That is correct.
8		And there are different levels which reflect different cost
9		recovery arrangements effectively, but both of those
10		require consultation with EMA at the commonwealth
11		level?---That's correct.
12		Are you familiar with, after that first request to EMA or the
13		initiation of COMDISPLAN at 6.23 on 8 February, request for
14		ADF personnel, Federal Police personnel and things that
15		happened in the following days?---In the following days I
16		personally made a request of the Australian Federal Police
17		for personnel. I did that direct with my colleagues in the
18		Australian Federal Police as well as I did with other
19		police jurisdictions, both around Australia and in New
20		Zealand.
21		And you would be familiar then with the fact that ADF provided
22		Search & Rescue personnel, emergency accommodation relief
23		services and things of that nature?---Yes, they did, yes.
24		Thank you very much.
25		CHAIRMAN: If I can say for the last time, we will see you on
26		Monday of next week?---Thank you, Mr Chair.
27		(THE WITNESS WITHDREW)
28		MS RICHARDS: Before I move to the next witness, there are a
29		number of parties who have indicated a desire to
30		cross-examine Mr Walshe when he returns on Monday. It
31		might be timely to remind the parties of what is set out in
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33		Bushfires Royal Commission
1		the practice note about cross-examination of witnesses.
2		CHAIRMAN: Yes.
3		MS RICHARDS: That is that cross-examination is by leave of the
4		Commissioners, that a party wishing to cross-examine a
5		witness must demonstrate a sufficient interest in doing so
6		and that at all times duplication and repetition is to be
7		avoided.
8		CHAIRMAN: Well, there hasn't been the request for leave, but I
9		think on the basis of the cross-examination, with some
10		exceptions, it has been appropriately focused, but yes, I
11		am glad of your giving that reminder.
12		MS RICHARDS: The next witness this morning is Mark Williams
13		from the Bureau of Meteorology. I do wonder, given the
14		time, whether it might be best to take the morning break
15		now and not interrupt the flow of Mr Williams's evidence.
16		CHAIRMAN: Yes.
17		(Short adjournment)
18		MS RICHARDS: I call Mark Williams.
19		MARK WILLIAMS, sworn and examined:
20		MS RICHARDS: Dr Williams, your full name is Mark
21		Williams?---That's correct.
22		And you work at 1010 La Trobe Street, Docklands?---Correct.
23		And your current position is the Regional Director of the
24		Victorian Regional Office of the Bureau of
25		Meteorology?---That is correct.
26		With the assistance of the lawyers for the Commonwealth, have
27		you prepared a statement?---Yes.
28		And attached to that statement is a report entitled
29		"Meteorological aspects of 7 February 2009 Victorian Fires:
30		An Overview"?---That's correct.
31		Are the contents of your statement true and correct?---They are.
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33		Bushfires Royal Commission
1		And, to the best of your knowledge, the contents of the report
2		are correct?---Yes.
3		I tender those.
4		#EXHIBIT 22 - Statement of Dr M. Williams with attached
5		report.
6		MS RICHARDS: I should also check you have copies of both of
7		those there in front of you, do you?---I do, yes.
8		Dr Williams, your formal academic qualifications, you have a
9		Bachelor of Science from the University of Adelaide?---Yes.
10		A Master of Science from the University of Washington in the
11		United States?---That's right.
12		And a PhD from Monash University?---Yes.
13		And you are a member of the Australian Meteorological and
14		Oceanographic Society?---Yes.
15		Of the American Meteorological Society?---Yes.
16		And also the Royal Society of Victoria?---Correct.
17		You have worked with the Bureau of Meteorology since the late
18		1960s?---Yes.
19		When you joined as a junior forecaster in the South Australian
20		office?---That's right.
21		You worked in Darwin in the early 1970s?---That's right.
22		And remained in the Northern Territory into the 1980s?---That's
23		right.
24		I understand that while you were in Darwin you had direct
25		experience with a very extreme weather event, Cyclone
26		Tracy?---Yes.
27		In 1982 you moved to the United States where you undertook your
28		Master of Science at the University of Washington?---That's
29		right.
30		And then you returned to Australia and took up a position in the
31		bureau's research centre?---Yes.
32		(7) 712 WILLIAMS XN
33		Bushfires Royal Commission
1		In 1987 you took up a position as a supervising meteorologist in
2		the bureau's training centre?---That's correct.
3		And in that position you were responsible for training new
4		forecasters?---That's right.
5		That's something that you did for about ten years?---That's
6		right.
7		Then you became the Manager of Forecasting Services in the
8		Victorian regional office?---Yes.
9		A position that you held until 2001?---Yes.
10		And at that point you were promoted to your current
11		position?---That's right.
12		Could you outline in general terms your experience with
13		forecasting for severe weather?---My experience?
14		Yes?---Yes. I suppose about half of my career has been as a
15		forecaster. When I started in Adelaide, I was forecasting
16		for all weather services including putting out warnings for
17		thunderstorms and fire weather. In Darwin the focus was
18		very much on tropical cyclone warnings. When I went there,
19		I was a junior forecaster, but in the mid-70s I became a
20		senior forecaster and put out quite a few warnings for
21		tropical cyclones, not for Cyclone Tracy but the ones that
22		came afterwards.
23		Although you are working in a management role rather than a
24		forecasting role now, you are involved in a number of
25		emergency management committees?---That's correct, yes.
26		Including the Victorian Emergency Management Council and its
27		coordinating group when required?---That's right.
28		If I can just touch briefly on the Bureau of Meteorology itself.
29		It is a Commonwealth Government agency and it has
30		responsibilities under the Meteorological Act?---That's
31		correct, yes.
32		(7) 713 WILLIAMS XN
33		Bushfires Royal Commission
1		One of those responsibilities is the issue of warnings of
2		weather conditions likely to endanger life or property
3		including weather conditions likely to give rise to
4		bushfires?---That's right.
5		And the provision of fire weather forecasting is covered in
6		detail by a fire weather directive that has been issued by
7		the bureau?---That's right.
8		For the Victorian regional office?---Yes.
9		I don't propose to take you to that, but for reference it is
10		annexure 12 to Mr Rees's first statement; the document
11		number of that document is WIT.004.001.0139. We will get
12		to the fire weather forecasting services that are provided
13		by the bureau in accordance with that directive shortly,
14		but could you first explain the bureau's involvement in the
15		declaration of total fire bans in Victoria?---Well, the
16		bureau doesn't, of course, issue the fire bans, but we work
17		very closely with the CFA when they make the decisions. So
18		every afternoon the bureau makes a number of estimates for
19		a number of locations across the state and the estimates
20		are for the temperature, the wind, the humidity and the
21		estimated fire dangers. If in any district there are more
22		than two locations which have a fire danger, a forecast
23		fire danger index of 50 or more, then we will put out a
24		fire weather warning, but we will also consult with the CFA
25		and they will discuss with us whether or not they will then
26		proceed to issue a fire ban for the following day.
27		So that is a decision for the CFA?---Yes, it is a decision for
28		the CFA, but with a lot of input from the bureau
29		forecasters.
30		And when the CFA has declared a total fire ban for a particular
31		day and a particular district, the bureau then includes
32		(7) 714 WILLIAMS XN
33		Bushfires Royal Commission
1		that in its forecasts for that district or town or for the
2		entire state for that day?---It does. With every forecast,
3		there is a section for warnings and that is included.
4		Mr Williams, can I ask you about the role that you played on
5		7 February this year?---Yes.
6		Could you please outline what you were doing that day; were you
7		at work?---Okay. I was on leave for the week prior. I was
8		at home and I was watching what was happening and I was
9		aware of the seriousness of the situation on Saturday the
10		7th. On the 7th I stayed at home, but I was in contact
11		with the senior forecaster at 1010 La Trobe Street on
12		several occasions just making sure that all arrangements
13		were put in place, particularly to be sure that we had
14		sufficient staff to put out all the warnings that we were
15		expecting to put out and confirm that we had an extra
16		person on at the IECC and that we had an extra person in
17		the forecasting centre for media and that everything had
18		been done that could be done to make sure that the services
19		were at the highest level that we could provide for that
20		particular day in anticipation of how bad a day it was
21		going to be, not knowing of course there were going to be
22		fires, but looking at the weather.
23		Mr Williams, if we can move to the attachment to your statement,
24		the overview prepared by the bureau, you have distilled
25		this report, have you not, into a power-point
26		presentation?---That's correct.
27		I propose to lead the content of this report from Mr Williams
28		through the power-point presentation that he has prepared.
29		CHAIRMAN: Yes.
30		WITNESS: All right, I will speak to the power-point.
31		MS RICHARDS: And I will ask questions from time to
32		(7) 715 WILLIAMS XN
33		Bushfires Royal Commission
1		time?---Okay. This is an overview of - well, the
2		meteorological aspects of the Victorian fires on 7 February
3		2009. (Go to the next slide.)
4		It is broken up into ten sections and I will step
5		through them one by one and then get back to them. So we
6		will open up with the fire weather forecasting warning
7		services provided by the bureau and then move on to the
8		relevant long-term weather patterns, then to antecedent
9		weather conditions including the temperature and rainfall
10		recorded in Victoria between October 2008 and February
11		2009; then to the heatwave of late January which was
12		extremely severe; then the weather during the week leading
13		up to the 7th including the reasons for the extreme heat, I
14		will try and give a bit of an explanation for that; then
15		the weather conditions on the day, on the 7th, with a few
16		hours either side; a bit of an explanation of why the winds
17		were so strong on the 7th; then the next one is
18		pyrocumulonimbus cloud. Pyrocumulonimbus is a thunderstorm
19		that forms over the top of bad fires and I will explain
20		that bit; and then the last two sections are relating to
21		the actual forecasts and warnings that were made for
22		7 February during the week and prior to communication of
23		those forecasts; and the last section is the forecast made
24		on the particular day.
25		MS RICHARDS: Dr Williams, I think the Commissioners may be
26		having trouble hearing.
27		CHAIRMAN: What I am suggesting is if the microphone is moved
28		around, Dr Williams can speak towards the screen and still
29		be heard. It is just a matter of the location of the
30		microphones?---Is that better?
31		Thank you.
32		(7) 716 WILLIAMS XN
33		Bushfires Royal Commission
1		COMMISSIONER MCLEOD: We were concerned about the web-casting
2		voice.
3		WITNESS: Okay. The first section is the fire forecasting
4		warning services provided by the bureau. (The next,
5		please.)
6		The Victorian regional office which is situated at
7		1010 La Trobe Street is responsible for the provision of
8		warnings and forecasts for the State of Victoria including
9		the fire weather warnings. During the last two years the
10		bureau has augmented its services through assigning a
11		meteorologist to the IECC to assist with the communication
12		of fire weather forecasts and warnings to the fire agencies
13		and to help explain that, there is a little diagram here -
14		in the centre there is the Victorian Regional Forecasting
15		Centre and the person in charge is the shift supervisor who
16		is in charge of all forecasts and all operations. The
17		orange colours are the fire weather products and the way
18		they are distributed and the others are the other bureau
19		products, other bureau activities. There is the shift
20		supervisor who looks after a number of staff who will put
21		out a range of forecasts - public, marine and for aviation
22		and severe weather.
23		MS RICHARDS: If I can stop you there, Doctor, where is the
24		regional forecasting centre located?---It is on the sixth
25		floor of 1010 La Trobe Street in Docklands.
26		Yes?---And these forecasts go out to the public through a range
27		of means which I will come back to later. But within the
28		forecasting centre there is a fire weather desk where there
29		is a person who does nothing but provide fire weather
30		products and these go out in two ways: one is to the
31		public through fire weather warnings and the forecasts are
32		(7) 717 WILLIAMS XN
33		Bushfires Royal Commission
1		issued by the media and the phone from the web. When I say
2		phone, it is the 1300 number for warnings. It also goes -
3		they go to the incident control centres where there are
4		going fires, where they issue spot fire forecasts and they
5		send it to them by fax. But they also communicate and send
6		products directly to the ICC. That's the fire weather
7		forecast and fire warnings and spot fire forecasts. In the
8		IECC, and this is the new development, we have a
9		meteorologist who is embedded in there and interacts with
10		the agencies directly.
11		You say that is a new development. When was the first fire
12		season when the bureau actually embedded a meteorologist in
13		the Integrated Emergency Coordination Centre?---It was the
14		season before last.
15		So 2007/2008?---That's right. At that time the CFA was not
16		operating out of the IECC, but in the last fire season they
17		were so they became a lot more integrated, if you like,
18		during the last fire season.
19		Just a brief overview of what is actually done at the
20		IECC by the meteorologist who is posted there and they work
21		from seven o'clock to five o'clock every day during the
22		fire season. They conduct a fire weather briefing at 9 am
23		to all the staff; produce a 7-day outlook at 10.30 and
24		accompanying audio recording available for all the IECC
25		staff; they participate in the DSE regional managers
26		teleconference at eleven o'clock in the morning and comment
27		to the IECC fire behaviour analyst (if there is one) on
28		automated weather data which is provided to them to help
29		them produce their firespread models; and they conduct a
30		CFA fire weather briefing on days prior to expected extreme
31		fire weather conditions and that is where the input goes in
32		(7) 718 WILLIAMS XN
33		Bushfires Royal Commission
1		to whether or not the fire ban is issued. Twice a week
2		they have a regular hook-up with the Victoria SES on
3		Tuesdays and Fridays to discuss the likelihood of other
4		types of severe weather events, whether it be heavy rain or
5		strong winds.
6		This is the background map which I guess we need to
7		keep in mind for the rest of the presentation.
8		I should say to those who are looking at the attachment, this
9		appears on p.4 of the attachment?---The green squares are
10		station places where the bureau has an automated weather
11		station which reports automatically into the bureau's
12		headquarters and our office. The red dots are locations
13		for which we issue spot fire forecasts and they are the
14		localities. If you go to the next picture, I can expand on
15		it a bit.
16		This is the map showing the Central Victorian region,
17		showing the locations with the automated weather stations
18		around the central part and also the locations for which we
19		provided fire weather forecasts. You will notice that
20		there are a number of weather stations here which have
21		funny acronyms like VICF, VICH, VICD, VICJ - they in fact
22		are portable automated weather stations that were deployed
23		before or during the event to gather extra data to help the
24		fire weather forecasters provide the best fire forecast
25		they can. There were five of them deployed: four of them
26		deployed for the 7th and a fifth one late on the 7th.
27		There are eight altogether in the system.
28		So you say four of them were deployed for the 7th?---Yes, the
29		Churchill fires and the Delburn fires down to the
30		south-east.
31		COMMISSIONER MCLEOD: Mr Williams, some of them have AP after
32		(7) 719 WILLIAMS XN
33		Bushfires Royal Commission
1		their name. What does the AP indicate?---That would be
2		airport. Geelong Airport, Grovedale.
3		Thank you.
4		WITNESS: So now we move to the long-term weather patterns.
5		This map of Australia shows the trend in the mean
6		temperature over the last nearly 100 years in degrees
7		centigrade per ten years. The areas in pink or red are
8		showing where the temperature has risen and the areas in
9		blue (if there were any) would show where it has got
10		cooler. Clearly, the whole continent has warmed during the
11		last hundred years and Central Australia is the area where
12		the warmth has been greatest, which is in this zone here
13		which is about .15 to .2 degrees per ten years; so that is
14		1.5 to 2 over the century.
15		Now turning to Victoria, this shows the annual mean
16		temperature anomaly which is compared to 1961-1990 average,
17		so all the blue areas which are mostly in the years from
18		1910 through to 1960 are times when the temperature was
19		below that average, calculated on that time period. And
20		then the red areas are where it is above average and it is
21		pretty graphic as you move from left to right and move into
22		the 80s and 90s and particularly the late 90s and 2000;
23		every year in Victoria has experienced above average
24		temperature.
25		And that is using as a base the thirty years between 1961 and
26		1990?---That is correct, and that is the World Met
27		Organisation Standard to calculate the base.
28		This next one shows very clearly how very dry it has been over
29		the last twelve years from 1 February 1997 to 31 January
30		this year. And it's broken up into areas of average, below
31		average, very much below average and lowest on record.
32		(7) 720 WILLIAMS XN
33		Bushfires Royal Commission
1		This is over a 12-year period. As you can see, nowhere had
2		above average rainfall, only one, two ... well, nowhere in
3		Victoria really got average except perhaps right up in the
4		corner in the highlands. Most of Victoria was either below
5		average or very much below average and there was a very
6		large slab over Southern Victoria, notably this area which
7		surrounds Melbourne, which was the lowest on record and
8		also into Western Victoria. We have had a very, very
9		severe long-term drought which still seems to be
10		continuing.
11		So moving through to the antecedent conditions
12		including the temperature and rainfall from October
13		to February, so this is sort of in the months leading up to
14		the event. (The next one, please.)
15		There are a series of maps here which show whether
16		the rain was above or below average during that period, so
17		going back to October it was a very dry month and with
18		virtually the whole state or the whole state below average
19		rainfall and most of Victoria very much below average
20		rainfall.
21		Then if we go to November, the situation changed, it
22		changed a great deal and we got quite good rains in the
23		east of the state and the northern part of the state with
24		above average rainfall in that sector. It was really only
25		in the far west that they didn't get the benefit of
26		reasonable rains, but if you move to the next chart which
27		is December, you can see that Western Victoria did pretty
28		well and got above average rainfall over much of the state.
29		So between the months of November and December the state
30		experienced quite good rainfall.
31		Then we move to January and the situation went back
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1		to what it was in October with a very, very dry month
2		indeed, and with below average rainfall over the whole
3		state and particularly lowest on record again in this zone
4		which is very close to Melbourne, this time a little bit to
5		the north-west of Melbourne. A very, very dry month
6		indeed.
7		And if we go to the next slide, this is showing the
8		same information in a different way; so instead of showing
9		above average and below average, what we are showing here
10		is the actual rainfall amounts and the reason I have put
11		this up is to show that there was a very, very large
12		portion of the state from the north-west extending all the
13		way down into towards Port Phillip and including the
14		western part of it which received either no rain at all or
15		less than 1 mL and even in the rest of the state rainfall
16		totals were really quite low.
17		We then move to February and again it was another
18		dry, very dry month with below average rainfall over all of
19		the state, but particularly in the western part of the
20		state, again another very dry area just near Warrnambool.
21		So that is the rainfall.
22		If we now move to the next slide and have a look at
23		the temperature. The temperatures tend to work in reverse
24		to the rainfalls so in the dry months we tended to observe
25		above average temperatures and in the wet months, below
26		average temperatures. So if we go back to October, we had
27		above average temperatures through most of the state,
28		particularly up in the north of the state.
29		If we then move to the next slide, it cooled down
30		quite a bit with more or less average temperatures over
31		most of the state. But if you go to December, in fact it
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1		was clearly in the zone which is less than average and that
2		was associated with the rain that was experienced across
3		Victoria. So we had a warm October, about an
4		average November and then a cool December.
5		Then moving to January and it flipped ride around
6		again. As everybody knows, it was an extremely hot month
7		particularly in inland Victoria. It was hot above average
8		everywhere, but over the coastal regions they had the
9		benefit of some sea breezes and some weak frontal activity
10		which took the edge off the temperature. However, in the
11		interior it remained very hot for the entire month.
12		February. Again it was a hot month, but not to the
13		same extent that it was in January. After the 7th cooler
14		air did work its way slowly through the state and took the
15		edge off it, but it was still a pretty warm month
16		in February.
17		So now turning to the heatwave in late January, which
18		in itself was a major event. This is a map showing the
19		temporary anomaly. They have used a different base here
20		and I'm not quite sure why but it still tells the story.
21		Where there is an area over south-eastern Australia with
22		quite extraordinary temperature anomalies, that is
23		temperatures above average of the vicinity of 12 to 15
24		degrees right across South Australia and Victoria. Very,
25		very hot air and very, very high temperatures experienced
26		in Victoria during that period.
27		And, Dr Williams, there is a part of Australia to the north
28		where the reverse was experienced, there were significantly
29		below average temperatures experienced during that same
30		period. Is there any connection between those two
31		anomalies?---Well, there is. Though it is difficult to
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1		understand exactly how it works but we do know there was a
2		monsoon active in Northern Australia at the time and the
3		reason for those lower temperatures are because it was wet
4		and cloudy up there. When it rains heavily in the north a
5		lot of heat is generated and some of it can find its way
6		through higher levels down into the southern parts of the
7		country, but it is a complex process by which this happens
8		and it is not very well understood. But it is not uncommon
9		to see this sort of dipole, what we call a dipole of wet
10		monsoonal activity up north and then very hot conditions
11		further south.
12		So during this period Melbourne recorded a maximum
13		temperature of 45.1 on 30 January and that was the second
14		highest record at the time. In particular, overnight
15		temperatures were extremely high and this resulted in
16		Melbourne achieving a record highest daily average
17		temperature of 35.4. Now the daily average is calculated
18		by adding the minimum and the maximum and dividing by 2.
19		It's not a perfect way to do it but it is the way we have
20		done this over many, many years and we keep records of
21		those.
22		Also during that period Melbourne set a record of
23		three consecutive days above 43 degrees and that was the
24		first time that that has ever happened. And in Mildura the
25		maximum was above 40 degrees for twelve consecutive days
26		which is a record for a Victorian station. So even though
27		there was a little bit of relief in the south of state,
28		extremely hot in northern Victoria.
29		Now, the weather during the week leading up to the
30		7th, so we are getting closer to the 7th, and what follows
31		is a series of weather maps. These are maps that are
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1		prepared for newspapers and they are not meant to show a
2		great deal of detail, they just show the broad sort of
3		pictures of what the weather was doing at the time. The
4		feature that was persistent throughout the whole time was a
5		high pressure system which was somewhere around south of
6		the country and to the east of the country directing
7		easterlies across the southern part of Australia. And up
8		north, as I mentioned, this dotted line represents the
9		monsoon trough. There was a Cyclone Ellie which moved
10		across the coast in Queensland, moved inland, produced
11		quite a bit of rain and two low pressure systems in the
12		monsoon trough there. So this pattern tended to persist
13		throughout the whole^ Finished editing here week without a
14		great deal of change.
15		If we move through to the next one which is Monday
16		the 2nd, there was a very, very weak change pushed through.
17		There would have been cooler air in the western part of
18		Victoria but warmer to the east. The dash line shows the
19		trough of low pressure and I will come back to that a bit
20		later on when I talk about the weather on the day.
21		Moving through to Tuesday the 3rd, much the same.
22		You still have essentially high pressure systems to the
23		south of the continent and easterlies blowing across much
24		of the country and the monsoon trough is very persistent,
25		very persistent across the northern part of Australia.
26		And then moving to Wednesday we are starting to see
27		an approaching front in the southern ocean. This didn't
28		come to anything. It moved away without affecting the
29		state very much at all but still easterlies across the
30		southern part of the country.
31		Then moving to Thursday, as we are getting closer to
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1		the event, much the same situation with hot air essentially
2		being trapped over central parts of Australia.
3		Then on Friday we are starting to see a bit of a
4		change occurring. We have a high pressure system with
5		several centres to the east of us and to the south of
6		Victoria. The monsoon trough persists and we are starting
7		to see some activity here in the southern ocean. This is a
8		front which was developed quite quickly and started to move
9		towards Victoria. So if we move to the next one, that
10		front actually slips away, as they do, to the south-east of
11		Tasmania but then a much more active front developed south
12		of south-west Western Australia and that started moving
13		towards Victoria.
14		So we had a situation where the air which had been
15		trapped over the continent was starting to be pushed down
16		towards Victoria and with a major cold front approaching
17		which was only going to help strengthen the winds and bring
18		those northerlies down through the State of Victoria.
19		If we go to the next one, just a bit of an
20		explanation of why it actually got to be so hot over
21		Australia. The air was trapped by the large scale weather
22		systems which were prevalent at the time and that was the
23		high pressure system to the south and the monsoon trough to
24		the north, and another factor was the record low rain falls
25		during early January meant virtually all of the incoming
26		energy from the sun was converted into heat instead of
27		being evaporated. You can imagine the sun shining on a
28		towel. If the towel is dry it gets quite hot but if it is
29		moist it is quite cool and the energy is being used into
30		converting that moisture into evaporation. So with the
31		skin temperature being so dry it meant the surface of the
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1		land got extremely hot and this in turn generates thermals
2		which are just little bubbles, like hot air balloons
3		without the balloons, being lifted up into higher levels
4		than usual and this happens every day, you can feel these
5		thermals when you fly and take off and land in an
6		aeroplane. But on this particular day, in this weather,
7		the heating was so intense that the thermals are being
8		lifted to great heights and hot air was being established
9		over southern Australia; not just near the surface but to
10		great depth. And then this store of hot air was then mixed
11		down to the surface ahead of the wind change as it
12		approached on the 7th.
13		So, just a little chart to try to explain a little
14		bit how this happened. If you go to the next one, it shows
15		how the wind was blowing down this side of the trough in
16		this direction. Then the easterlies here and then
17		south-westerlies around the low here and then to the north
18		the monsoon trough. Essentially it is like a big mix
19		master, the air was growing round and round.
20		That is what you refer to as an anti-cyclone?---No, that is
21		actually cyclonic.
22		Going clockwise?---It is at low levels. However, and I haven't
23		attempted to show this, but at high levels, at about 15,000
24		feet or 3 or 4,000 metres it changes direction, it becomes
25		an anti-cyclone which flows, in fact, in the opposite
26		direction and that stored the heat. I actually didn't put
27		that up there. I tried to not make it too complicated.
28		But you do refer to the large anti-cyclone in the body of the
29		report?---Yes.
30		As being a feature?---A feature, yes.
31		Of the very extreme heat we experienced in late January and then
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1		again early February?---Yes. There was - at upper levels
2		there was a jet stream which was coming down through the
3		west and the air was going around in this direction
4		(indicating) which is a large, middle level anti-cyclone
5		which stored the heat in the middle levels and it was
6		subsequently brought down by the low, mixing down to lower
7		levels.
8		You say in your report that those deep warm anti-cyclones have
9		not previously been recognised as a discrete weather
10		phenomenon but it is thought that one of those explained
11		the Adelaide heatwave experienced in the 2008 summer?---In
12		the previous year, yes.
13		Is that a weather pattern that is becoming more prominent?---It
14		may be but we haven't studied them to any depth. I don't
15		think I could say yes for sure until someone has actually
16		looked back to do a history of these types of weather
17		events.
18		Is there a hypothesis as to why these deep warm anti-cyclones
19		are experienced this summer and again in a significant way
20		in the summer of 2008?---Well, we are experiencing a
21		warming trend, as I showed in those earlier slides and the
22		hotter the surface of the continent gets, the more air is
23		going to be lifted to middle levels and it tends to get
24		trapped into these middle level circulations, these
25		anti-cyclones. I believe it is some way linked to the
26		monsoons but it is not in a way that is very easy to
27		understand and I think the only way we are going to ever
28		understand that is for someone to do some research into
29		this.
30		COMMISSIONER MCLEOD: Mr Williams, if I could understand you
31		clearly, you are really saying that that phenomena you just
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1		described may have been present at times in the past but
2		may not have been noticed or seen to be significant?---I
3		think that's a fair statement.
4		But there is now a kind of realisation that it can be a
5		significant factor in affecting weather to the
6		south?---Yes, that summarises it pretty well.
7		Thank you.
8		WITNESS: If you move onto the weather conditions that occurred
9		on Saturday the 7th. First of all, back to the broad scale
10		maps and if I can take you back to the previous charts I
11		showed, we now have this front approaching. It is 5 am on
12		Saturday the 7th. This vigorous front approaching the
13		south eastern corner of Australia. We have - now this is
14		very important - a trough line which runs from a low
15		pressure system in Central Australia all the way down the
16		coast of South Australia and in fact had, during the night,
17		pushed across the coast even about as far as Melbourne. So
18		many parts of southern Victoria actually experienced a
19		reasonably cool night because of the presence of that air
20		pushing up just temporarily across the coast.
21		MS RICHARDS: And that changed?---That changed extremely
22		rapidly. By eleven o'clock in the morning it was all gone
23		because there is a strong pressure gradient between the
24		high pressure system here and the approaching low and the
25		front and this then brought down this stored hot air from
26		Central Australia and pulled it right down over Victoria
27		very rapidly and that temporary pre-cooling just
28		disappeared. So that little front pushed in during the
29		night and then was pushed out to sea and then disappeared.
30		The next one shows what happened during the day, so
31		this is 5 pm and there was a - this line here, which is the
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1		dash line which is the trough and is now becoming the
2		front, and I will come back to that in a minute, with
3		colder air to the west of it pushing in behind but still
4		hot air running down the eastern side of that weather
5		system. The major front is still out over the water and
6		that didn't actually come through until later in the night.
7		And by 11 pm we have southerlies or cooler winds blowing up
8		on the western side of this trough line which has become
9		the major wind change or had become the major wind change
10		and the warm air to the east.
11		If you move to the next slide, that's 5 am without
12		the arrows - yes, and then that shows the front finally
13		pushing through the southern part of Victoria.
14		This is the satellite picture at eleven o'clock on
15		the morning of the 7th. The bright areas show the cloud,
16		particularly the high cloud. This is an infrared satellite
17		picture. It shows where there was monsoon activity, a
18		tropical cyclone, but in particular, the front was well
19		west at this stage and was actually associated with this
20		line of cloud here, but middle level cloud streaming out
21		ahead of it over the ocean to the south of us. But over
22		Victoria, virtually no cloud whatsoever, it was quite
23		clear.
24		Just remind us, where was the low level trough at this
25		stage?---At eleven o'clock on the 7th it would have been
26		just lying along the coast or just off the coast.
27		Just off the coast of south-western Victoria?---Yes. Not
28		visible in this picture.
29		So during the day, extreme fire weather, it was
30		extreme throughout the state. Most of Central Victoria
31		experienced maximum temperatures above 45 degrees
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1		centigrade. There were a number of records set. An all
2		time state record of 48.8 degrees centigrade was set at
3		Hopetown in Western Victoria and that exceeded the old
4		report of 47.2 in Mildura back in January 1939.
5		Melbourne had a maximum of 46.4 which exceeded the
6		previous all time record of 45.6 on Friday the 13th of
7		January 1939 and this is very significant, Melbourne's
8		maximum of 46.4 was a full 3.2 degrees above the
9		old February record which was set in 1983. This is quite
10		extraordinary when you consider that the records go back
11		154 years for Melbourne.
12		I am going to show the passage of the wind change as
13		it moved across Victoria in a lot more detail. This is a
14		map which shows where all our automatic weather stations
15		are across the whole state and including the portable ones
16		that were put out there. What we have done is we have used
17		the data gathered from these automatic weather stations,
18		plus where we can from our radars which help us to position
19		the wind change but nothing else, so we have only used
20		Eurodata at this stage and not incorporated any other on
21		the grounds of reports of where the wind change may have
22		been until we can fully investigate how accurate they may
23		be.
24		The first one shows the position where it was at
25		noon. Now, the line is about where we believe the change
26		is but we have got a hatched area either side of it. That
27		is to indicate there is a degree of uncertainty in actually
28		locating the position of these changes. It doesn't attempt
29		to show how uncertain it was. It is the same width on
30		every line. It is just to show that there is uncertainty.
31		As we do further analysis we might be able to reduce that
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1		uncertainty in some locations but we might have to increase
2		it in other places because of the difficulty of actually
3		pinning down exactly where a change is. Sometimes it is
4		easy, sometimes it is not so easy. At noon - if you can
5		just go back, please - the change had not come through into
6		Western Victoria, even though our computer models had
7		predicted it was going to be somewhere about here. So it
8		was moving at that point slower than we at first thought
9		that it might be moving.
10		If you go to the next one. At one o'clock it has
11		gone through Cape Otway and has moved into Western Victoria
12		and that is Port Fairy and that is Warrnambool, so it is in
13		between those two stations.
14		If we move to the next one, it shows it is now
15		starting to move into Western Victoria. What I haven't
16		explained and I should have was that each of these feathers
17		here show the wind direction and speed, so it is the
18		direction from which the wind is coming so that means it is
19		coming from north-west and each of those bars are 10 km/h
20		intervals so that means it is a 40 km/h wind. And there is
21		a temperature of 44 degrees and the numbers in red is
22		relative humidity. We just remove the place names just for
23		the sake of clarity and can go back to them at any time.
24		So the winds are blowing from north-west and getting quite
25		strong across the whole of the State of Victoria. The
26		winds are shifting more to the west around the wind change
27		line which is slowly progressing across Western Victoria.
28		If we now go to the next one, it is 3 pm. That's
29		actually quite slow movement. It is only about 30 km/h
30		that the change is moving. It has taken more than two
31		hours to get to Cape Otway and still hasn't got through
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1		Aireys Inlet. You will notice that the wind change is sort
2		of gradual over Western Victoria as it is moving through
3		and it was a bit hard to find in places. So the wind ahead
4		of the change is a - is northerlies and then shifts around
5		to the west and in some places it shifted twice, it went
6		more north-west than west south-west but you can see the
7		difference.
8		On each of those lines there is quite a pronounced bend?---Yes.
9		In fact there are a couple on the last one. Why is that? Why
10		does it not move across as a straight line?---It is just
11		the nature of the beast. They surge. I suppose the best
12		analogy I can think of is like a wave breaking on the beach
13		and as it rushes up the sand; it is not a perfectly
14		straight line, there are sort of little waves within these
15		waves that are pushing up into little different areas and
16		making these little arcs that you see when the wave gets to
17		the end of the sand.
18		We heard from Mr Rees in his evidence that the wind change lines
19		tend to move faster over water than over land?---That's
20		correct, yes.
21		And due to friction over land it slows down?---Yes.
22		And he also indicated that the Great Dividing Range was another
23		feature that tended to slow down the passage of the change
24		over land?---Absolutely, and I will - this will become very
25		clear as we move on. But I think I am pointing out here
26		that at this point they very often rush round the corner,
27		around the Otways and come up towards the Port Phillip area
28		at great speed but on this occasion it was moving fairly
29		slowly as it moved over the water. But that's quite right,
30		the lower friction over the water does allow the changes to
31		move faster.
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1		The next one, please. It is 4 pm now. It has gone
2		through the areas, gone through Grovedale, Geelong Airport
3		and is starting to push up towards the southern part of
4		Port Phillip and it is starting to move faster too, it is
5		starting to accelerate.
6		The next one, 5 pm, it has moved right up to the top
7		of the bay. These little kinks, it is a bit hard to work
8		out where they are. There is not a lot of data here to
9		show exactly where the change was there but we are pretty
10		confident about where it was as it was moving through the
11		bay. You will notice that it sharpens. The winds are much
12		more south-west or even tending more to the south, to the
13		west of it and the north-westerlies are continuing here so
14		at this point it is becoming a very sharp change. It
15		started out as a more gradual change across Western
16		Victoria but as it moved into Central Victoria it has
17		sharpened up quite a lot.
18		If you move to the next one. By 6 pm it really is
19		moving very, very rapidly and moving well up into Central
20		Victoria. Now, this little kink here, we have confidence
21		that that is real(?) because we have picked up a signal
22		from our radar in high sensitivity mode which was actually
23		able to sort of pinpoint that little kink there. I guess
24		that is an illustration of the fact that these are not
25		straight lines and probably not as straight as drawn where
26		it is away from data that we can use to verify that.
27		As we get through to 7, it is still moving very
28		rapidly right up to Central Victoria but it is moving
29		particularly rapidly through Gippsland. After starting off
30		quite slowly it is really accelerating as it moves over the
31		waters to the south of Gippsland and you will see the next
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1		couple of slides just how fast that is moving.
2		8 pm it is getting into the central part of Gippsland
3		around Lakes Entrance. 9 pm, if we stop there for a
4		minute, it has moved almost all the way to the eastern part
5		of the state, very, very rapidly across the water there.
6		However, it is starting to feel the effect of the
7		mountains. It did go through Mt Baw Baw but it wasn't very
8		long before the wind switched around to the north so it
9		only just got through Mt Baw Baw and it never went through
10		Mt Buller, the winds swung around with a bit of a shower up
11		there. The front, effectively, started to stall as it got
12		up into the mountains. It is also, of course, late in the
13		day, it is night-time and you are starting to lose the
14		temperature contrast across the front. So there's two
15		reasons why it is slowing down. But it is losing all its
16		push.
17		If you go to the next one. It is continuing to push
18		hard through eastern Gippsland but it has just been trapped
19		around Mt Buller, that is. Even though the winds are
20		westerly, we don't believe that was associated with a
21		change, we believe that was associated with a shower of
22		rain. Then we go to 11 pm and it still has this kink. It
23		is starting to get pretty hard to find now, as it moves up
24		into the north so there is still a good wind shift across
25		it up near Yarrawonga. Then we lost it. It may have been
26		up through there somewhere in the mountains but by then it
27		was losing its real identity.
28		While you have that chart in front of you, I might ask you about
29		some wind change times that were reported by the chief fire
30		officers last week for the various fires?---Yes.
31		For Kilmore East, Mr Rees told us that the wind change went
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1		through between 1800 and 1900 hours. Does that accord with
2		the observations?---Could we go back to, not all the way
3		back, to about 6 pm. What was that time again?
4		Between 6 and 7?---Yes, yes, I think it went through soon after
5		six o'clock.
6		For Horsham, Mr Rees said that the change went through at
7		1628?---We have checked this and that accords well with our
8		records too.
9		For Coleraine he reported two possible times, one between 1300
10		and 1400 and the other one quite precisely at 1323?---Yes.
11		The change was moving through - it was a bit hard to be
12		sure but that fits in well with our records. We have gone
13		and checked all of his times.
14		Then for the Weerite fire, Mr Rees reported that the change had
15		moved through at quarter past two?---Weerite - I'm not
16		quite sure exactly where it is.
17		It is near Cobden, Camperdown?---Yes. We looked yesterday and
18		confirmed that was correct.
19		Churchill, Mr Rees reported that the change went through between
20		6 and 6.30?---Yes, that was pretty close.
21		Redesdale, again, 6.30?---I don't have this in front of me but
22		we did check this yesterday and that was confirmed, within
23		broad parameters.
24		Bendigo, quarter to seven, so a little bit later than
25		Redesdale?---I believe so.
26		Murrindindi - Mr Waller reported that the change affected the
27		Murrindindi, Marysville, Narbethong area at half past
28		six?---That seems to be about right. We don't have any
29		reports. There is an area where we didn't have any reports
30		but it was in that vicinity.
31		The Bunyip fire, Mr Waller told us the wind had changed a little
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1		before six?---Again, I think that was - going back to my
2		recollections yesterday when we checked in - that is around
3		the mark, not greatly different from our records.
4		And Beechworth in the far north east of the state, Mr Waller
5		reported that the change had arrived quite late?---It was.
6		Which is consistent with what you just showed us?---Yes.
7		So quite late might be 11, twelve o'clock?---Yes.
8		Thank you. If you can continue with the slides?---Just getting
9		back to the strong winds that occurred on the day. There's
10		a very strong contrast between the hot air over the
11		continent and the cooler air over the ocean to the south
12		west and this concentrates the air, the warm air ahead of
13		the change and the cool air behind the change and this is
14		called frontogenesis. So whenever you have got very hot
15		air over the continent running along the coast and then
16		some cool air approaching from the south-west, the actual
17		process of the air becoming hotter and hotter during the
18		day, the air tends to - the pressure tends to drop along
19		the trough line and a process called frontogenesis which
20		means strengthening of a front occurs. There is some
21		fairly complex theory behind this but this is, I guess, I
22		would like to leave it, make it as simple as that. It is
23		just the way air masses come together. Instead of just
24		being a broad boundary between broad warm air and cold air,
25		they tend to come together and sharpen up the boundary and
26		as that happens the pressures increase along to the east
27		and causes the air to run down the side of the front very
28		rapidly.
29		It is that phenomenon that causes Melbourne to - Melbourne and
30		large parts of Victoria - to experience quite sudden rapid
31		changes in weather during the summer months?---Oh yes, yes.
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1		A large drop in temperature and a sudden change in wind?---That's
2		right. You get the strong heating ahead of the front. The
3		hot air is brought down over Melbourne and over southern
4		parts of Victoria and then the cooler air comes in from the
5		west and there's a very sharp drop in temperature, that is
6		quite a common experience in summer. But as well as that
7		there are typically strong winds aloft and they tend to get
8		mixed down to the surface and it adds to that whole process
9		which we call frontogenesis. So just a little bit of a map
10		here to try to explain that a bit. If we go to the next
11		one, it just shows - the next slide, yes, that's right -
12		the hot air streaming down to the east of what is now
13		becoming the front and the cooler air behind what is now
14		becoming the front but the old front still well out to the
15		west. And we know about this these days and it has become
16		much better understood and numerical models are
17		sophisticated enough now to be able to predict this sort of
18		process and give us good guidance. Ten, 15 years ago we
19		would have been waiting for the front to come but we don't
20		do that any more because we know we are going to have this
21		process occur which will bring the change in much more
22		quickly than the original front.
23		CHAIRMAN: Could I just check in relation to that, the angles
24		and the timing of that front will always be variable but is
25		that within the normal range, if you like, rather than
26		quite different in significant respects?---Do you mean our
27		accuracy of being able to forecast?
28		No, the way it is coming across?---Okay, yes.
29		That one - I have got to go back a couple really to show you -
30		but the way it really comes across in terms of
31		approximately the angle and approximately the times ...
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1		yes?---Only very approximately.
2		There's just too much variation?---There is a lot of variation.
3		You can't say that there's a normal progression across that
4		line?---No, certainly not. Perhaps if we leave it at that
5		for the moment. That shows sort of almost tram tracks
6		across the state. Sometimes the front comes in northern
7		Victoria much, much more quickly than occurred in this
8		case.
9		Can I just say my comment is a lay comment. It does seem to be
10		pretty well, coming from the south-west sort of almost 45
11		degrees and moving across with the sort of expectancy that
12		you would have that the Great Dividing Range will cause
13		some disruption, but otherwise it seems to be relatively
14		uniform?---It does on this occasion but they do stand up a
15		lot straighter on some other occasions. On other occasions
16		they lie back a lot more and I just happened to notice
17		there is an example of a front, a wind change, it is
18		actually one of our charts that would have been a forecast
19		but very close to what actually happened, as an example of
20		a wind change chart which shows a completely different
21		picture and it shows almost north-south orientation and
22		moving eastwards and then just being bent back by the
23		mountains. Yes, I think we need to be wary of trying to
24		assume that they behave too much the same.
25		Okay. In order to illustrate that you need to show half a dozen
26		others to illustrate that point but what you are saying is
27		don't assume that is typical?---No. It is broadly
28		representative of what happens but there is a lot of
29		variation from case to case.
30		MS RICHARDS: Dr Williams, before you move from the phenomenon
31		of frontogenesis to the next phenomenon you are about to
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1		explain, is that phenomenon that brings about the extremely
2		wild weather, in lay terms, that is typically experienced
3		on a high fire weather day - strong northerly winds
4		followed by strong southerly or south-westerly
5		winds?---Yes, yes. So the front intensifies and it
6		strengthens the northerlies ahead of the front and then the
7		southerlies that come in behind can be very gusty. But on
8		the front itself, it can be very turbulent and a very
9		dangerous area for any sort of fire activity.
10		Thank you.
11		COMMISSIONER MCLEOD: I think, Mr Williams, that might have been
12		what the chairman was perhaps hinting at. Is it a familiar
13		characteristic, what you just described then?---Yes.
14		Even though the shape, if you like, of the front may vary, and
15		its intensity may vary, it is a typical pattern with a
16		northerly or a north-westerly wind blowing with a cool
17		front approaching it to be replaced, at some point, by a
18		change in wind direction coming from the
19		south-west?---That's correct, yes.
20		MS RICHARDS: And typically those winds will be strong in either
21		direction?---Yes, yes, they will, especially if the front
22		comes through during the daytime.
23		Right?---Okay, the next little topic is one that has created
24		quite a bit of interest. There were clouds form over the
25		top of the very intense fires which were called
26		pyrocumulo-nimbus clouds. A cumulonimbus cloud is a
27		thunderstorm and pyro means it is heat induced, and they
28		can bring some rain, though usually there is very little,
29		hail, lightening, also can produce extreme low level winds
30		and in some cases tornados.
31		But that, mercifully, was not something we saw on
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1		7 February?---I couldn't rule it out. If there was one, it
2		would have been very small in scale but we have no way of
3		actually having an observation of that. They're time
4		things.
5		Okay?---So this shows the visible satellite imagery which was
6		taken at 3.50 pm on the 7th over the fires from a US
7		satellite. You are just starting to see a little bit of
8		pyrocumulus where the brighter clouds are here and down the
9		Churchill fire there was also some. And the Dargo fire,
10		that was really just more smoke. So, this is a picture,
11		actually, it is on the cover of the report, and it shows -
12		it is really meant to show more just the extent of the
13		smoke plume but it does show the beginnings of the
14		pyrocumulus.
15		Just while we are looking at this photograph, it shows smoke
16		plumes from the Kilmore East fire?---Yes.
17		The Murrindindi fire which was underway by then?---Yes.
18		I think also the Bunyip fire somewhere there in the
19		middle?---Yes, I think that's it there, probably.
20		And the Churchill fire further to the south-east?---Yes.
21		And then up in the north-east, that is a fire in the high
22		country around Dargo?---Yes.
23		COMMISSIONER MCLEOD: Just while that image is there - sorry, I
24		was about to say just while that image is there,
25		Mr Williams. How frequently do you get images from that
26		satellite in an example like that?---It is not one of our
27		regular weather satellites. I think we can get them on
28		request once or twice a day. There is a website where you
29		can download them. I don't know the answer to that.
30		So that may have been a specific request?---Or else they
31		downloaded it from a website. I believe there is a public
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1		website where those pictures can be downloaded but I would
2		have to check on that.
3		But you say an image of that nature could have been ordered or
4		requested or downloaded, whatever the term is?---Look, I
5		will have to check, I don't know.
6		Is it an experience that the bureau has that when bushfires,
7		perhaps serious bushfires are present that you would be
8		requested to provide additional imagery to what you
9		normally receive?---We don't have - we normally use our own
10		weather satellites - when I say our own, the ones that are
11		put up by the Japanese satellite, which is the primary one.
12		It doesn't have the capacity to give us special pictures on
13		- - -
14		Demand?---Demand. That's my understanding. We don't just rely
15		on the satellite pictures, of course, we rely on radar and
16		other things as well.
17		CHAIRMAN: Can I say, it does appear that the radar, and you may
18		be coming to it?---Yes.
19		Gives a very similar picture but making allowances for the sort
20		of colour imagery rather than the detail that comes with a
21		photograph?---Yes. Radar is actually showing you something
22		different and I will explain that in a minute and radar
23		doesn't ... the thing about satellite is that it covers the
24		whole country or everywhere; whereas radar have a limited
25		range and you can only get useful data fairly close to
26		where the radar is located.
27		MS RICHARDS: I think in a few slides time there is a slide that
28		shows those major smoke plumes from the Kilmore East
29		one?---I think it is actually the next one.
30		Yes, and there we are?---That shows - radar is designed -
31		weather radar is designed to actually find rain but because
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1		there was so much smoke it was able to pick up the smoke
2		images, get echoes from the smoke. This is the Melbourne
3		Airport radar. The normal Laverton radar had an
4		air-conditioning failure, two air conditioners failed
5		because of the extreme heat and we used the back-up which
6		is at Melbourne Airport but it's in fact a little bit
7		closer to the fire so you still got some quite good
8		pictures of what was going on.
9		And you can see clearly there, the smoke plumes from the Kilmore
10		East fire, the Murrindindi fire and the Bunyip fire?---Yes,
11		yes, that's right, the three of them. The Murrindindi is
12		up here.
13		This is a graphic that I had drawn up to try to
14		explain just what is actually happening in the fires. You
15		have hot air, of course, on the surface and you have
16		burning bush generating huge amounts of heat. What is
17		important is that it is not just heat that it is
18		generating, it is also generating moisture. So even though
19		the forest was extremely dry, of course it is alive with
20		sap and that's converted into moisture and it is thought,
21		or in fact studies have shown that this is an important
22		factor in developing a large pyrocumulo-nimbus. So you
23		have hot air rising and it is carrying moisture, there is
24		even a little bit of moisture in the air, it reaches a
25		certain level where it condenses into cloud droplets and it
26		is taking soot and embers up with it and once it condenses,
27		these hot air bubbles rise even more strongly because
28		latent heat is released and there is a strong air current
29		which flows right up through and carries this cloud right
30		up to great heights, and on this occasion, right up into
31		the stratosphere which is higher than most thunderstorms
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1		usually get to because of the intensity of the updraft is
2		just so strong. There's a wind at the middle levels which
3		tends to take the storm away from the fire so as these
4		cumulonimbus form, they tend to get or they get taken away
5		by the winds and so any rain that does form really falls
6		back on the fire. They are electrically very active with a
7		great deal of lightening which tends to occur downstream
8		from the fires and that's illustrated with that little
9		picture there.
10		So what you have just given us is an explanation of how fires
11		create their own weather?---Yes, yes, that's right. It
12		can, they can produce a tornado and there can be very
13		strong turbulent winds around the storm, as there can be
14		with any thunderstorm.
15		When this phenomena is occurring what are the weather conditions
16		like underneath that?---Well, you may or may not be getting
17		any rain. It is almost certainly likely to be windy and
18		turbulent, just depending on what is actually happening
19		with the eddies that are flowing into the storm. But the
20		factor that is probably most dangerous is the lightening
21		that keeps striking the ground and it's quite terrifying, I
22		believe.
23		Thank you.
24		COMMISSIONER MCLEOD: Is this the phenomena that has been
25		described where the column at a certain point
26		collapses?---Where the column collapses?
27		Yes. Or are we talking about a different thing - you know,
28		where there have been observations of quite defined very
29		high columns of smoke and perhaps cloud rising above an
30		intense fire which at a certain point kind of collapses on
31		itself?---Well, it needs the fire to keep going, so as it
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1		moves away from the source of the heat, it will collapse.
2		There's not enough moisture in the atmosphere to sustain
3		those storms. If it were not for the fires it would have
4		been perfectly clear over that area during the day. It was
5		formed entirely by the fires and can only be sustained by
6		the fires.
7		What impact would you envisage that would have on the ground,
8		where a column like that seems to be collapsing?---Well, it
9		could produce downdrafts, it could produce - because all
10		this air is being drawn up into the clouds. When it
11		collapses, if it has got a bit of moisture or hail with it,
12		it may well come down in downdrafts and these are observed
13		in normal thunderstorms and there's no reason why they
14		wouldn't be observed in a collapsing pyrocumulo-nimbus.
15		And when these downdrafts come down and hit the ground,
16		they can do so with great force and blow down trees and do
17		a lot of damage. They are not tornados, they are just
18		lumps of colder air that have come down from great height.
19		They wouldn't necessarily drop vertically, they might come down
20		and spread to some degree?---Yes, because the whole thing
21		is caught up in the prevailing winds.
22		Thanks.
23		MS RICHARDS: I should ask, just to complete that train of
24		thought, was that phenomenon of sudden downdrafts something
25		that was observed on 7 February?---I don't know but there
26		may have been. It is not something that you can readily
27		observe and it's very difficult to pick up with radar and
28		sometimes we don't know that it has happened until it has
29		happened, until there has been a report of the damage which
30		we know is consistent with a downdraft.
31		So you have your wind readings at the various automatic weather
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1		stations but you are not entirely sure what is causing them
2		at any time?---That's right, there is a mix of the
3		prevailing wind and also the local effects and then also
4		what might be caused by something such as this, that's
5		right, and there is a lot of interpretation required.
6		Okay, now we get to the actual forecast and warnings
7		made for the 7th during the week prior and how they were
8		communicated to the public and the authorities. This is
9		the rehit of just a reminder of the slide that I put up
10		before pointing out that the forecasts come from the
11		regional forecasting centre at 1010 La Trobe Street,
12		Docklands and they are issued to the public through the
13		media and that we have the fire weather desk and all the
14		activity that is going on in the IECC.
15		There were extensive forecasts provided to the public
16		during the lead-up to the event which are done on a routine
17		basis. There is the state forecast, there are district
18		forecasts, township forecasts and warnings as required. If
19		you go to the next one, please. The forecasts are from
20		Monday the 2nd which gave very strong indications that
21		Saturday was going to be a very hot and windy day and then
22		from Wednesday onwards in particular it became clear that
23		we really were heading towards an extreme day on the
24		Saturday, indicating that temperatures would be well into
25		the 40s throughout most of the state on Saturday
26		of February. I can't remember an occasion where the
27		forecasters have been so strong in calling a message that
28		far out. They knew that the air had become extremely hot
29		over Central Australia. The guidance we got from the
30		numerical weather prediction systems was consistent and
31		there was - always wary about trying to make a forecast too
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1		extreme that far out because something could go wrong but
2		the signals were so strong that they did call it and call
3		it very, very strongly, and the forecasts and the warnings
4		were provided through the media and the website as it got
5		closer to the 7th.
6		In addition, an extensive range of forecasts were
7		provided to the agencies from the RFC during the lead-up to
8		the event. I have jumped ahead of myself. This is for the
9		fire agencies, so there is a four-day outlook fire weather
10		forecasts, and I can give an example of that. That's a
11		product that was issued from the regional forecasting
12		centre at 4 pm on Tuesday the 3rd and it gives the weather
13		maps over the next four days with a sort of written brief
14		of what is likely to occur on any particular day. If you
15		go to the next slide, that's the sort of - yes, that's it -
16		that's the sort of information that is provided for each
17		particular day with a vigorous cold front which will
18		approach the state from the west and - well, I won't read
19		it all out. It provides that sort of descriptive
20		information to go along with the maps.
21		That product, the fire weather outlook, is provided to the fire
22		agencies?---Correct, that's right. Also, we issue what we
23		call estimates, or they are specific fire weather
24		forecasts, for a number of locations right around the state
25		and this is the one that was issued on the Friday afternoon
26		I think it was. Yes, that's right, 4.45 on Friday
27		afternoon. And this is a lot more detailed and gives the
28		estimated maximum temperatures for all these locations, the
29		dew point which is another - like relative humidity but a
30		measure of moisture, the wind, speed gusts, the drought
31		factor which is an indication of the dryness of the forest
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1		and how dry the grass is and then finally calculation of
2		the fire danger indices, that is the grassland and fire
3		danger indices. If there is a wind change expected, then a
4		four hour time window is included in the right-hand column.
5		How far out is that product produced?---This year, for the first
6		time, we do it up to four days in advance.
7		And the four day fire weather forecast is provided to the
8		agencies?---Correct, yes.
9		At some stage does that become publicly available on the
10		bureau's website?---Yes, for the day before, for the single
11		day before they are publicly available on the bureau's
12		website and I believe this particular product was available
13		on the website.
14		Was this product also made available to media with the general
15		forecasts that are routinely sent to media outlets?---No,
16		it just appeared on the bureau's website.
17		There's two columns there for the FFDI and the GFDI which we
18		know is the forest fire danger index and the grass fire
19		danger index with extremely high values in both
20		columns?---Yes.
21		At what stage are forecasts of the fire danger indices made
22		available to the public and how?---At what stage?
23		Yes, if at all?---It only appears in this particular product
24		which is for the day before. I will have to check. I know
25		it is available on the day, on the Saturday morning and I
26		think it is also available on the Friday afternoon, that's
27		this issue. I will just check on that but not any of the
28		earlier issues which includes the fire danger indices.
29		Typically, general forecasts that are posted on the bureau's
30		website and that are sent to media outlets will include a
31		fire danger rating - so, low, medium, high, very high,
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1		extreme?---Yes.
2		That familiar semicircle?---Yes.
3		And extreme starts at values of 50 and above?---That's correct,
4		yes.
5		But the forest fire danger index and the grass fire danger index
6		are not provided with those general forecasts; is that
7		correct?---That's correct, yes.
8		Is there any reason why that could not be done in the
9		future?---Well, that's an interesting question. It could
10		be. I guess my concern is that I don't know how well they
11		would be understood. People like numbers and obviously the
12		higher the number, the more extreme the fire danger index
13		is. It is there for the 24 hour forecast so I suppose they
14		could be made available for longer periods. We calculate
15		them routinely, we do them every day.
16		So if on 6 February you had known where to look on the bureau's
17		website, you could have had this information?---Yes, I
18		believe that's right, that is late on the day.
19		But it wasn't made widely available through the media?---No,
20		there was no broadcast of the fact that the fire danger
21		index was going to be say, for example, grassland, 190,
22		that's the peak.
23		Of course the fire danger, both for grassland and forest, was
24		originally designed to go up to only 100?---Yes.
25		And the fire danger rating of extreme kicks in at 50?---Yes.
26		We don't have a fire danger rating that distinguishes between
27		values of 50 and values of 190, or in one instance there,
28		330, do we?---No, we don't and that's because, going back
29		to the original work by McArthur and colleagues, it was
30		never validated beyond those numbers. It certainly hasn't
31		been validated above 100.
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1		So those fire danger ratings, are they drawn from the original
2		work of McArthur in developing the index?---Yes, yes, they
3		are. They were originally worked out using a circular
4		calculator. We have gone and produced equations that mimic
5		those - what you get out of a circular calculator, but the
6		equations are, in a sense, open-ended, so there is nothing
7		to stop sort of high numbers coming out of the equations
8		which are calculated by the computer; whereas the circular
9		calculator wouldn't have allowed you to do that.
10		Now that it is possible to calculate fire danger indices of
11		greater than 100, would you agree it is time to review the
12		corresponding fire danger rating scale?---Look, that's not
13		something that my office would do but it's clearly a
14		research project that would have to be done with all the
15		parties involved.
16		Where would you expect that work to be done?---I guess we could
17		look at it through the bushfire CRC. That's one of the
18		avenues where they could look at it. I don't have any
19		particular control over what they do but I guess that is
20		clearly an issue that has come out of this event, as to
21		what those numbers really mean and it's - yes, it is an
22		area that is a bit out of my expertise but it is clearly, I
23		think, some sort of a signal coming out of those larger
24		numbers.
25		COMMISSIONER MCLEOD: Mr Williams, the work that was done to
26		develop equations that enabled you to calculate values
27		beyond 100, was that work done by the bureau in conjunction
28		with bushfire authorities or was it simply a kind of
29		mechanical replication of the equations that are embedded
30		in the McArthur circular calculator so as to be able to
31		just extend the values automatically as the individual
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1		elements were applied to the equation or the equation was
2		applied to the individual values?---Look, I don't know who
3		actually developed the equations, I don't know the answer
4		to that. The very big advantage, of course, is once you
5		have got the equations, is they can be embedded in a
6		computer system and then when we have got all the inputs,
7		the temperature and the humidity, et cetera, clearly it can
8		generate the fire danger indices far more efficiently than
9		any other way. But I don't know - it was done some time
10		ago but I don't know how it was actually done.
11		I think you mentioned the cautionary word that there would need
12		to be some validation?---Yes.
13		Of the relevance of those figures?---Yes.
14		Beyond 100 if they were to be used with any reliability?---Yes.
15		CHAIRMAN: Ms Richards, could I inquire whether that particular
16		sheet is in the material.
17		MS RICHARDS: It is.
18		CHAIRMAN: Whereabouts? Because p.65 gives a comparable but for
19		a different date.
20		MS RICHARDS: It is part of appendix 8 which is a rather large
21		collection of - - -
22		CHAIRMAN: It is close to 200 pages. It is somewhere there.
23		MS RICHARDS: Yes. Perhaps I could locate it over the luncheon
24		break and advise - - -
25		CHAIRMAN: I will browse.
26		MS RICHARDS: But, yes, all of the products that Mr Williams has
27		included on his slides are contained in the body of the
28		report, with the exception of the diagram explaining
29		pyrocumulo-nimbus?---Yes.
30		All of the other information is contained in the body of the
31		report.
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1		COMMISSIONER PASCOE: I would just like to ask a question of Dr
2		Williams. You have, in your career, had experience of
3		cyclones and the use of cyclone warnings?---Yes.
4		During our community consultations we heard a lot from people
5		about warnings and the adequacy of warnings and for many
6		people the image of the cyclone warning was one that was in
7		their minds and gave them confidence of a simple, easily
8		communicated system that would give them a better
9		differentiated alert. Could you see a scenario in the
10		future where any development of the forest fire danger
11		index and the grass fire danger index could be then
12		elaborated into some kind of more developed but simply
13		communicated warning system?---Using that siren, the SEWS?
14		I suppose it is coupling the research?---Yes.
15		Ms Richards has just asked you a question about the development
16		of research beyond the 50 trigger point?---Yes.
17		And so the question, I suppose, is the very extreme ratings that
18		we experienced this season and given some of your earlier
19		presentation about the warming that we are experiencing and
20		the projections seem to be toward an extension of those
21		weather patterns, so it does beg the question about whether
22		we need to further develop both the grass fire and the
23		forest fire danger indexes; so the question is: having
24		undertaken, should we undertake work of that sort, could it
25		provide the basis for a warning system, a fire warning
26		system similar to a cyclone warning system?---I think so,
27		yes. I mean what we are looking for here is a trigger,
28		isn't it? Some sort of ... such as in the cyclone warning
29		system where, if I remember correctly, it is when a threat
30		is imminent, I think. When I was in the Northern Territory
31		we used what is now SEWS but in fact it was the cyclone
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1		warning, the siren, when it was imminent, and that was, you
2		know, some hours away, not just about to happen. But it
3		gave people sufficient time to act. It is quite a - it is
4		a very distinctive sound. I think it was quite effective
5		in that situation. So yes, I think there is an opportunity
6		to look at that.
7		Thank you.
8		MS RICHARDS: I can inform the Commissioners that my learned
9		friends for the Commonwealth have turned up that particular
10		page. It appears at p.178 of the report and the document
11		number in the top right-hand corner is 0194. It is not
12		formatted in the same way as that slide but it does contain
13		the same information. (To witness): Dr Williams, before
14		we leave fire danger indices, we heard from Mr Rees, I
15		think it was, that fire danger indices fluctuates
16		throughout the day?---Yes.
17		With varying temperature, wind speed and relative humidity.
18		That forecast contains high figures. How is that forecast
19		arrived at?---How is it arrived at?
20		Yes?---Each of the elements?
21		Yes?---Well, we provide - the first part of it I suppose is the
22		maximum temperature. Now these are the fire dangers at the
23		time of maximum temperature.
24		Right?---So the maximum temperature is calculated for all of
25		Victoria actually using the system we have currently in
26		place and for all of these states, using numerical weather
27		models to assist us, give us a first guide of forecaster
28		experience with knowledge of how weather persists and its
29		behaviour and it has evolved, the amount of cloud and
30		putting that all together and also weather observations, of
31		course, that is a key point, just not the weather
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1		observations from the automatic weather stations on the
2		ground and the other observing stations, but the data we
3		collect from upper air by releasing balloons which tells us
4		how high the temperatures are in upper levels, and other
5		types of data we get from satellites which can tell us how
6		much moisture there is in the atmosphere, at least over the
7		ocean; that is all combined to come up with a maximum
8		temperature forecast. The same with the humidities and the
9		wind, it is just part of a whole general sort of forecast
10		process.
11		I think you have answered my question which was that those
12		values there in the two columns for the fire danger indices
13		are the fire danger indices forecast for the time of
14		maximum temperature?---That's correct, yes.
15		The next slide?---Okay. That is just the bottom of it. Okay,
16		so in addition to that there were extensive range of
17		briefing material which was also provided to the agencies
18		at the IECC during the lead-up to the event. These are
19		weather forecast charts which go out to seven days with
20		briefing notes and then when you get from four days inwards
21		there are graphics of likely weather and fire dangers out,
22		from four days out. So I will go through and show us
23		actually what happened on that particular week.
24		This is the first product that was issued on Sunday
25		1 February and it shows the last four days - three days -
26		Thursday, Friday and Saturday, the outlook with
27		accompanying charts and some words indicating what was
28		likely to happen in that period towards the end of the
29		week. And then moving to Tuesday the 2nd which is the next
30		one, there was a similar product but for Friday, Saturday
31		and Sunday and then Wednesday similarly, just based on the
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1		weather maps that we have, which are generally computer
2		generated or are computer-generated with some texts to give
3		the agencies a bit of a heads-up about what is likely in
4		the outlook period.
5		Once we get to four days, the service is ramped up
6		and these charts are produced for each of the four days. I
7		have only put up the one for the Saturday. So this was the
8		one that was issued on the Wednesday. If we stay with the
9		Wednesday, we might look at that for a bit longer just to
10		explain it. It has the forecast districts, it has got
11		little black arrows which show the likely direction of the
12		wind, the possibility that there could be a wind change
13		which was drawn in that area there. And, so you have got
14		the colour-coded fire danger indices - that's the forest
15		and that's the grassland on the right. A little bit lower
16		in the south-west of the state because at that time it was
17		thought the wind change might be through the western part
18		of the state much earlier than actually happened. The
19		weather map and a description of what was likely to happen
20		in terms of fire weather and the synoptic pattern.
21		It was on this day that the call was made very loud
22		and clear that we were expecting an extreme day - at the
23		ICC, this is now at the centre, an absolute extreme fire
24		weather spike day and I guess they were words that were
25		thought of at the time but they show the picture as
26		graphically as could be done. There is also other
27		information on likelihood of lightening which is of great
28		interest to the fire agencies, of course, and
29		precipitation.
30		Then we move to the product that was issued on the
31		Thursday for the Saturday. A little different in that they
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1		are now forecasting extreme over the entire state for both
2		the fire danger indices but still telling exactly the same
3		story because the weather patterns were very consistent as
4		we were approaching the Saturday. And these products, of
5		course, are provided to the fire agencies in the IECC and
6		used for the weather briefings they do there and they have
7		been very well received because of their very simple but
8		clear sort of graphics, I think.
9		If you go to the next one, please, for Friday. It
10		hardly changed and these are all in the report, of course.
11		This is the weather map showing the front approaching and,
12		again, we are still expecting the extreme fire weather to
13		occur over the whole of the state on the Saturday. So from
14		Wednesday onwards we were saying to the fire agencies they
15		were expecting extreme fire danger indices, both forest and
16		grassland over the whole state.
17		If you go to the next one. We are still in that
18		section which is leading up to it so I will go to the
19		actual day in a minute. This is it, the last section:
20		forecasts and warnings made on the 7th on that day and
21		communication of those forecasts and warnings to the
22		authorities and the public. So on the day the RFC was
23		still doing what it continues to do - sorry, the regional
24		forecasting centre - producing state forecast warnings,
25		district forecasts, et cetera, and they confirmed that, as
26		I have said before on several occasions, that we would get
27		those extreme weather conditions. And then the forecasts
28		are provided through the media and the bureau's website.
29		Quite an interesting statistic here. On the 7th the
30		website had in excess of 75 million hits and that compared
31		with a daily average of nearly 44 million hits
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1		during February 2009. So, most of that would have been
2		associated with the fires because all through February
3		there were a lot of hits associated with cyclones.
4		It must be noted that there was some very extreme weather going
5		on at the northern end of Australia at the same time with
6		floods in Queensland?---That's correct, that clearly
7		doesn't tell a whole story; it is just meant to give a bit
8		of a picture but it is an enormous number of hits and the
9		system stood up to the pressure.
10		If I could just ask you at that point about the Bureau of
11		Meteorology's website. Is it designed in a particular way
12		to enable it to carry that amount of traffic?---It is
13		because the - every product that you access on the web is
14		quite small in the number of kilobytes so each download is
15		designed to be very small and that is for accessibility
16		because there are many people out on the land who are at
17		the end of a single line that trickles across the farm and
18		we like to think that they have got the best opportunity to
19		use the web. So, they have gone to a lot of trouble with
20		even selecting the colours that, even though they are
21		effective, that they don't take a lot of computer
22		kilobytes.
23		Thank you?---In addition the fire weather forecasts and warnings
24		were provided to the agencies, also from the regional
25		forecasting centre. These included the spot fire forecasts
26		that were actually issued for the fires.
27		If I could stop you there, what is a spot fire forecast. We
28		have had a lot of talk about spot fires and I think that is
29		a different thing from spot fire forecasts?---Yes. When
30		requested by the agencies, they fax in a request for a
31		special forecast which is a tailored forecast for a
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1		particular area which is for a fire, a fire site. So,
2		during the day they send in these requests and we produce
3		forecasts and there is an example which I will put up on
4		the screen in a minute but they are tailored forecasts.
5		They are quite different from the general forecasts that we
6		put out in that they are - it is the best we can do to try
7		to predict what the weather is going to be, whether it is
8		going to be at the actual fire site. It takes into account
9		where possible the terrain, where the wind is likely to
10		flow up and down mountains, or it might be different at the
11		top of a mountain than down below and it is done, as I
12		said, on request for a client.
13		Do those forecasts include a forecast of the likely timing of
14		any wind change that is expected?---Yes, yes, but in a
15		fairly broad sort of a block, yes.
16		COMMISSIONER MCLEOD: Do the forecasts, spot fire forecasts,
17		take into account the vegetation in the area?---No. We
18		leave it to the agencies to work out what might be actually
19		occurring in the particular locality. That is one thing we
20		don't know about. We try to stick to the weather.
21		So they could make some kind of extrapolation based on the
22		acknowledge of vegetation?---Yes, that's right.
23		During the whole day there was frequent communication
24		between the regional and forecast centre and the
25		meteorologist at the IECC. The phone was running the whole
26		day. And also at the IECC the forecaster there and - I
27		haven't actually - I put it in the report but I haven't
28		made a point of it here. We rostered on an extra person on
29		that particular day. Normally there would only be one
30		person on between 7 and 5 but we were requested to provide
31		an extra meteorologist and a second person came on from
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1		three o'clock in the afternoon and worked until about 2.30
2		the next morning. So in fact there were two meteorologists
3		at the IECC during that particularly busy period when the
4		wind change was moving through central parts of Victoria.
5		And there is an account of the activities of those
6		meteorologists in the report starting at p.57?---That's
7		correct, yes.
8		Okay, next. This is a summary of the forecasts that
9		were issued from the regional forecasting centre during
10		that day, starting at around 3.30 in the morning. The red
11		ones are fire related products and the ones with the star
12		are those which are specifically for the fire agencies. So
13		the first one was the fire ban advice which was just a
14		rehit of what the CFA had issued, a fire weather warning,
15		then a severe weather warning for the strong winds and then
16		three spot fire forecasts, and this is, of course, for
17		fires that were already going to the 7th February and they
18		were provided for the agencies.
19		And provided at the request of the agencies?---At the request of
20		the agencies, that's correct, yes. As you can see, as the
21		day went on there were a large number - there was a lot of
22		activity producing spot fire forecasts specifically for the
23		locations for which they were requested and that was done
24		by the fire weather forecaster on the fire weather desk
25		with the assistance of an extra person who was working
26		alongside him who was monitoring the thunderstorms but also
27		doing spot fire weather forecasts.
28		Running my eyes down that list I do not see a spot fire weather
29		forecast for Murrindindi?---That's correct. We did not
30		receive a request for a Murrindindi spot fire forecast
31		until the following morning just before two o'clock.
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1		CHAIRMAN: 3.37 am?---That is when it was issued, yes.
2		The fire weather briefing which was issued on the
3		Saturday was very similar to the ones that were issued in
4		the lead-up on the Wednesday, Thursday and Friday. I
5		didn't really have to change the words all that much, it
6		really just confirmed everything that had been said before.
7		That is an example of a spot fire forecast. That is one
8		for Churchill, I think it was. Yes. And it gives an
9		example of the type of information that is included. The
10		request includes the location and this is received by fax
11		and we enter that material into - the request into our
12		systems and then we write a weather overview and it
13		includes - somewhere in there there is a wind change; yes,
14		that is looking at the wind change to affect the fire area
15		between 1730 and 1900, I think that is. And then further
16		down there's a tabular information on sort of a three hour
17		by three hour, blow by blow of what is expected with the
18		temperature, the relative humidity, the winds and the two
19		fire danger indices. That's worked out for the whole state
20		but with no adjustment for the particular localities. As
21		time goes on, the fire danger indices drop dramatically
22		after the wind change had gone through. So that's one of
23		very, very many spot fire forecasts that were issued during
24		that afternoon.
25		The other product that is issued is the wind change
26		forecast chart which is one fairly general sort of product
27		which indicates likely positions or our best estimates of
28		where the wind change is likely to be in three hourly or
29		thereabouts time blocks. This is the first one that was
30		issued at 1200. Now, we don't normally issue one before
31		the wind change has moved across the coast and before we
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1		have some idea of how quickly the wind change is moving but
2		because the day was so extreme, the forecasters in the
3		regional forecast centre decided to put one out anyway just
4		to give the agencies a bit of a heads-up of what we were
5		thinking. At that stage it was still yet to hit the coast.
6		Then the next one was issued at 10 to 2 after which
7		time the change had actually passed through Western
8		Victoria, with estimates of the time that it was likely to
9		move eastwards across into eastern Victoria. The next one
10		was issued at 4.30 pm when the change was starting to move
11		or had moved into Port Phillip area and it was predicted to
12		push right up into north eastern Victoria and the last one
13		was that was issued was at 1830 which was when the change
14		was pushing right through that area.
15		Just having looked at those wind change forecast charts in
16		succession, there is a statement at paragraph 340 of
17		Mr Waller's statement in relation to the Murrindindi fire
18		where he says the south-westerly wind change entered the
19		region at 1830 and that it arrived earlier than predicted
20		and passed through the area with greater force than had
21		been forecast". Would you like to respond to that
22		statement?---Well, he could only have been working off the
23		wind change chart, as far as I know, because that's the
24		only forecaster that we had, and it is true that the
25		prediction of the forecast lines of position were slow. As
26		I pointed out before, the wind change is moving slowly
27		across Western Australia and then it accelerated greatly,
28		doubled in speed in Western Victoria. So after that wind
29		change chart, yes, the lines did indicate that it would
30		come through a bit later; however, the forecasters at the
31		IECC - both of them were in constant communication with the
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1		state duty officer - they had picked up that the change was
2		moving more rapidly than the chart and had conveyed that
3		information to the staff at the IECC as the afternoon
4		progressed. So, whilst the change chart might have been a
5		bit slow, it was verbally passed on to the IECC as rapidly
6		as they possibly could.
7		While we are on the subject of communications between the
8		forecasters and people at the IECC, are you able to tell us
9		whether the forecasters, Mr Parkin and Mr Williams, had any
10		communications with Dr Kevin Tolhurst, the fire behaviour
11		scientist?---I think Kevin Tolhurst may have had some
12		communication - Kevin Parkin might have had some
13		communication with Kevin Tolhurst a bit earlier in the day.
14		They don't work side by side, the fire behaviour analyst is
15		in another area so they have ... as I recollect, he did
16		have communication but not a great deal of communication.
17		Thank you?---This is just a very short summary stating what
18		happened, that there was an exceptional event on
19		7 February, exceptional heat accompanied by very strong
20		winds and a vigorous change that moved from west to east
21		during the day, and the details are contained in the report
22		which is an attachment to my statement.
23		Thank you, Dr Williams. May we include the slides of that
24		presentation within the exhibit?
25		CHAIRMAN: If the answer is that it is readily capable of being
26		put onto a DVD, if it is not already, that is the sensible
27		thing to do?---Yes, I brought it on a CD so.
28		All right, the CD is part of the exhibit.
29		MS RICHARDS: What I will do is create a cross-reference sheet
30		that cross-references the slides to the page in the report.
31		Just one final matter before I sit down,
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1		Dr Williams. You would be aware of a review produced by
2		Bruce Esplin of the April 08 windstorm?---Yes.
3		Which we have been taken to previously. There was a
4		recommendation made in that review that the Bureau of
5		Meteorology contact list for severe weather warnings be
6		strategically managed in consultation with emergency
7		service organisations to identify critical contacts and it
8		was also recommended that the bureau must ensure the detail
9		for these critical contacts remains up to date. Could you
10		tell us what action the bureau has taken in response to
11		that recommendation?---We haven't specifically worked with
12		the ESOs to strategically work out the contact lists;
13		however - - -
14		I think I should stop you at that point. When did you become
15		aware of this report?---Oh. I didn't see the final version
16		of the report until just a week or so ago.
17		Do you know when it was made available to the bureau?---No, I
18		don't think that we actually - we downloaded it from the
19		website. However, we did have correspondence with someone
20		from the - Brian O'Brien, the emergency services officer,
21		who spoke to us and he told us what was likely to be in the
22		report but we did not actually see the final version of the
23		report. We downloaded it from the website and I think it
24		is still labelled "confidential". However, we have
25		reviewed all our contacts. They are up to date. It is
26		very extensive for our severe weather warnings, there are
27		over 100 or so on the list, but in terms of actually sort
28		of working through that recommendation to the letter, we
29		haven't done it yet but I see no reason - well, I will take
30		an undertaking to do it, put it that way.
31		Thank you, Dr Williams. I have no further questions. If you
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1		would wait there, I think there might be some other
2		questions for you.
3		CHAIRMAN: Could I just inquire - I think we will adjourn now -
4		could I inquire who else seeks to ask questions.
5		MS MCLEOD: I may have some clarifying questions on behalf of
6		the Commonwealth but I would prefer to go, as we did
7		yesterday, second last as it were.
8		MR LIVERMORE: I have about ten or fifteen minutes worth.
9		CHAIRMAN: I think it is sufficiently long that we will - if it
10		had been very quick I would have postponed lunch but I
11		think in the circumstances we will commence at two o'clock.
12		(THE WITNESS WITHDREW)
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1
2		UPON RESUMING AT 2.00 PM:
3		MARK WILLIAMS, recalled:
4		CROSS-EXAMINED BY MR LIVERMORE:
5		Dr Williams, just a couple of questions about the wind change
6		charts that were towards the end of your presentation. I
7		think there was one at 1830 and one before that on the
8		7th?---It is right at the end.
9		That is one at 12 o'clock. If we go back to the 1630. That is
10		a wind change forecast chart issued by the bureau at 1630
11		on 7 February?---Yes.
12		Can you just interpret for us, Dr Williams, when that chart has
13		the wind change going through the Kilmore area?---On that
14		chart it would have gone through just before 2000, which is
15		8 o'clock.
16		The Marysville area?---The Marysville area, which is to the
17		right of the arrow, some time after 8 o'clock.
18		Between 20 and 2300?---Yes.
19		If you could go to the 1830 chart, and that line that says
20		"actual"?---Yes.
21		Is that an estimate, or was that the actual position of the wind
22		change as best could be anticipated at that time?---It was
23		the best as could be estimated at that time. I think it
24		was, on looking back at it, it was probably, it is not
25		clear there, it was the 6 p.m. position rather than the
26		6.30 position, at 1800.
27		Does it say that anywhere on the document?---No, it doesn't, it
28		is not clear.
29		In any event, that has got the actual not far from Kilmore, or
30		about ready to go through Kilmore?---Yes.
31		Marysville, we are still looking at about 2100?---Yes.
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1		You were taken to the evidence that Mr Waller gave to the
2		general effect that the wind change actually moved through
3		the Murrindindi, Marysville area. It got there a bit more
4		quickly than the bureau had been anticipating?---Yes.
5		You don't have any quarrel with that evidence, do you?---Based
6		off that chart, he said off the forecast, and that is true.
7		As I said before, our forecasters at the IECC did verbally
8		advise staff at the IECC that the wind change was moving
9		faster.
10		They would not, however, have been telling anyone at the IECC at
11		1830 anything different to what is depicted on the chart as
12		at 1830, would they?---As at 1830, I don't think so, not at
13		1830, not after that particular chart had come through.
14		So you had spoken to the bureau officers who were on duty at the
15		IECC?---Yes.
16		And they have told you in general terms that they were providing
17		briefings, and at some point gave indication that the wind
18		change was moving more quickly than previously anticipated?
19		---Yes.
20		Just a couple of questions in relation to convection columns,
21		and please tell me if these questions go beyond your area
22		of expertise. They relate to some issues raised by
23		Commissioner McLeod earlier. Is it true to say that every
24		fire has a convection column?---Yes, I think that is true,
25		though most of them are very small and don't produce
26		anything more than an invisible bubble in the area, put it
27		that way, yes.
28		But large bushfires of the kind that we had on 7 February are
29		capable of producing very large convection
30		columns?---That's correct, yes.
31		Is there any way that during the course of a fire that the
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1		bureau can first of all identify the fact that a large
2		convection column exists in relation to a particular
3		fire?---If it has got cloud in it and it has got cloud
4		droplets that can be returned from radar, the radar is the
5		best possible tool to identify that it is there.
6		Does the bureau endeavour to do that during the course of
7		running bushfires?---Yes, because there is a person who is
8		rostered on to look after, to watch out for convection, and
9		it is just a form of convection, if you like, so there may
10		be other thunderstorms that they have to monitor, it is a
11		thunderstorm that has been precipitated by the fire, and it
12		would be monitored and followed as with other storms.
13		These large convection columns have the capacity, do they not,
14		to cause embers to spot a much greater distance than might
15		otherwise be the case?---That is my understanding, yes.
16		Is it the case that, indeed, depending upon the size of the
17		convection column, that they can cause spotting out to 35
18		kilometres or something thereabouts?---I am not an expert
19		in this area, but that, I don't know about 35 kilometres,
20		but certainly the embers would be carried that far, whether
21		or not the embers are capable of starting new fires that
22		far down, I don't know.
23		Did the existence of any convection, large convection columns
24		associated with the fires on 7 February, did any such
25		observation find its way into any report that the bureau
26		did during the course of the day regarding the weather
27		conditions?---No, you mean the actual thunderstorms and the
28		way it might have affected the weather, is that what you
29		are saying?
30		Yes?---No, it is on a very fine scale which we have not picked
31		up, or so far identified from our automatic weather
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1		stations. If, down the track, there is evidence that there
2		may have been some, a downburst, as we were discussing
3		before, did occur, and we can find evidence of it, well
4		then we would look at reporting on that.
5		That is after the event?---After the event, yes.
6		You are reliant upon an analysis of material after the
7		event?---Exactly, yes.
8		Has any such analysis occurred in relation to the Kilmore East
9		and Murrindindi fires?---No.
10		As far as the bureau is concerned at this stage it is not able
11		to help the Commission either way on whether there was a
12		small, medium or large convection column and what happened
13		to such convection columns?---We know there was a large
14		convection column, we can certainly show that on radar, but
15		what the effects may be, we haven't done any work on that
16		at this stage.
17		A large convection column can have a dramatic impact upon the
18		local weather that the column is near or over?---Oh, yes,
19		yes.
20		Is that right?---Yes.
21		And indeed, can cause at ground level different direction and
22		velocity of winds that is otherwise applying in the
23		area?---That is certainly true.
24		This phenomenon of a convection column collapsing, I gathered
25		from your answers to Commissioner McLeod that if that
26		occurs, its impact on the local area can be quite
27		dramatic?---Well, it depends on whether it collapses
28		rapidly or whether, in fact, there is a downburst from
29		colder air aloft which collapses and hits the ground with
30		great force, and these things are very unpredictable. I
31		wouldn't want to say whether it would have happened or it
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1		wouldn't have happened. It may have collapsed and just
2		dissipated in a more gradual way, I don't know.
3		The bureau's position is that at the moment it doesn't know
4		either way in terms of Kilmore East and Murrindindi fires
5		as to whether a collapsing convection column had some or
6		great or little impact upon damages to houses and the
7		course of the fire, et cetera?---At this stage, no.
8		In general terms though, could a large convection column that
9		collapses cause by itself significant damages to
10		buildings?---To buildings?
11		Houses?---Look, it depends on the structure of the buildings, I
12		don't know how I can answer that.
13		Is the answer yes, depending on the circumstances?---It would
14		depend on the circumstances and the structure. It can do
15		damage to trees, I know that.
16		Thank you, that is all.
17		CROSS-EXAMINED BY MS MCLEOD:
18		Dr Williams, just some clarification arising from those
19		questions. The first is, you were asked about wind change
20		charts for Kilmore and Marysville and the prediction of the
21		wind change time. Can I just ask you to explain the time
22		the front passes through a particular region, is that the
23		time that the bureau would expect to see instant wind
24		changes, or shortly around that time?---It depends on
25		whether or not the wind change is sharply defined. In some
26		areas it would change from a northwesterly to a
27		southwesterly in a matter of 10, 15 minutes, but on other
28		occasions it can take two hours to swing all the way
29		around.
30		On your graph, or your graphic you had the representation of the
31		wind change, or the front moving through, with the blurred
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1		lines on the side?---Yes.
2		Of the thick lines that represented the front, could you just
3		explain to the Commission why there is a degree of
4		approximation around those lines?---What we have done is,
5		we have looked at the automatic weather stations and as far
6		as we can tell, made a judgment as to where those lines are
7		between where it was, the wind was from the northwest and
8		has gone right around to the southwest. One of the factors
9		that we take into account is the humidity. If you look at
10		the red numbers of the automatic weather stations they are
11		higher, which means the relatively humidity rises behind
12		the change, that is one of the things that tells us that a
13		change has gone through. The air ahead of it tends to be
14		much drier. The only other thing is the temperature falls
15		but it does not fall necessarily very quickly. For
16		example, it is still 41.
17		In the north of the state?---The north of the state is still 41.
18		Whether are not the change has fully gone through that is
19		problematical. At the moment we have someone who is
20		working on this very problem and is doing a very detailed
21		analysis of every single automatic - every station across
22		the state to try to determine the point at which the change
23		started to go through and the point at which the change
24		finished going through to try to get a much better idea of
25		how long that actually took at each particular location.
26		It will be very different for some stations than others.
27		This is retrospective analysis?---Yes.
28		One of the difficulties in interpreting the data coming from
29		your weather stations and radars ahead of time is to know
30		how quickly the front will be moving?---Yes.
31		And what immediate impact it will have or what delayed impact it
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1		will have on local weather conditions, would that be a fair
2		statement?---Yes.
3		As best as the science is able, you express an opinion in terms
4		of the expected time as a range?---Yes.
5		To fire services?---Yes. That's right.
6		When you issue weather change charts, for example, I have
7		noticed the one Mr Livermore took you to, says, "Timing of
8		wind changes cannot be forecast with precision and
9		positions are best estimates"?---That's correct, yes.
10		You have the ability or fire services have the ability to ask
11		for the spot fire forecast as well, don't you?---Yes.
12		That enables or a request for a spot fire forecast triggers the
13		bureau to respond to a request from either CFA or DSE to
14		look at conditions local to the area they have specifically
15		identified?---That's right.
16		Just in terms of Kilmore and Marysville, at Kilmore, there were
17		spot fire forecasts issued on three occasions on 7
18		February. Those are annexed in your appendix?---That is
19		correct, yes.
20		There was one for Murrindindi but late in the evening?---Yes.
21		It wasn't until early next morning.
22		In terms of looking at efficiencies in the system and matters
23		that you have turned your mind to since these fires,
24		physically, it is usual for the bureau to receive a faxed
25		request from an incident control centre for these spot fire
26		forecasts?---That is how it works.
27		That is a faxed piece of paper with fields written in usually by
28		hand?---Yes, with position et cetera.
29		To reduce the time that it would take for the bureau to respond
30		to those faxed requests, you have looked at the possibility
31		of having them produced on a website so that you can simply
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1		copy the data on the form straight into the form that you
2		are sending back again?---Yes, that would improve
3		efficiency quite a bit.
4		Those sort of measures are things that the bureau is turning its
5		mind to reduce the turnaround time for those spot weather
6		forecasts?---That's correct, that is something we have to
7		work through with the agencies. I believe that is the way
8		it is done in the United States and I think that is
9		something we should move towards but we also are using
10		technology which will help us to populate the fields in
11		those forms with pretty good first estimates just to try to
12		speed the process up a bit. We started doing that this
13		year and we hope to refine it next year.
14		What it would mean that the incident controller would have to
15		have access to the computers so they could send you the
16		information by computer rather than fax machine?---Anything
17		that is in a computer generated form is a lot easier to
18		deal with.
19		You were then asked about the convection columns and the
20		incidents of pyrocumulo-nimbus. The fire weather warnings
21		you provided with the IECC and these, for the Commission's
22		reference, are reproduced on 5 February at page 145 of the
23		report, on 6 February at page 165 and on 7 February at 197.
24		Each of those refers under the heading of lightning to the
25		possibility of pyrocumulo-nimbus effects. There was one
26		there, I think.
27		181 is the witness number and that is at page 165 of the report.
28		If we can bring that one up. Under the heading,
29		"Lightning", there, which is on the left-hand side, the
30		notation is and this one is for, issued on, it looks like 6
31		February. Under, "Lightning" on the left-hand side you
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1		have got, "Unlikely, low probability, less 5 percent with
2		change and possible with any fire induced pyrocumulus.
3		So certainly the bureau is discussing with the first agencies
4		days ahead the possibility of this fire activity, weather
5		activity?---Could possibly produce pyrocumulus, yes.
6		If we could look at the Kilmore spot fire forecast at page 224,
7		just to go back to the questions I asked you about these
8		forms, spot fire weather forecast, page 240 is the witness
9		statement number or page 224 of the report. Do you have
10		your page open there, Dr Williams?---The spot fire
11		forecast.
12		At page 224?---Yes.
13		For Kilmore?---The page numbering is slightly different on mine.
14		The time of the forecast is 5.37 p.m.?---Yes, I have got it.
15		You have see under, "Weather overview": "Strong and squally
16		north to northwesterly wind will shift cooler south to
17		southwesterly this evening between 6.30 and 7 p.m." That
18		was specific information you were providing to the incident
19		controllers at approximately 5.37 p.m. that
20		evening?---That's right.
21		You will see under the heading, "Assumptions and uncertainties"
22		further down that page, you report the change has
23		accelerated into Central Victoria driven in part by
24		convection near the developing frontal boundary"?---That's
25		right.
26		That was the information you gave to the agencies at 5.37 or at
27		least the controller at that site?---Yes.
28		MS RICHARDS: I have nothing in re-examination.
29		MR LIVERMORE: Mr Chairman, just while there is a gap, I have
30		the document the subject of the call this morning, that is
31		the letter from the Minister for Police and Emergency
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33		Bushfires Royal Commission
1		Services dated 30 April 2009 and it is the letter
2		evidencing an interim review of the State Emergency
3		Response Plan to be completed by the end of September 2009
4		so I can tender that letter. I have provided copies to
5		council assisting.
6		CHAIRMAN: Thank you.
7		MR RUSH: I call Mrs Joan Davey.
8		JOAN FRANCES DAVEY, sworn and examined:
9		MR RUSH: Mrs Davey, is your name Joan Frances Davey?---Yes,
10		that's correct.
11		You live at [...] Warrnambool?---I do, yes.
12		Mrs Davey, you are the mother of Robert Davey, the mother-in-law
13		of Natasha Davey?---Yes, that's true.
14		And grandmother to Georgia Davey who was three years old and
15		baby Alexis, three months old, who died in the
16		bushfires?---Alexis was eight months.
17		I am sorry. Died in the bushfires on 7
18		February?---Unfortunately that's true, yes.
19		Just in relation to your son, he had set up and established his
20		own business as a wine merchant?---Yes, with the help of
21		Natasha, Robert and his wife had established a very
22		successful business and well respected in the industry.
23		They resided at 15 Bald Spur Road in Kinglake?---That's correct,
24		yes.
25		Approximately how long had they lived there?---About eight
26		years.
27		Are you able to describe generally the block, how big it was,
28		firstly?---I would say their home was on an acre block, it
29		was relatively clear in relation to the area. There was
30		some large trees but it was a lawned area and there was no
31		undergrowth. It was a large block.
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1		How big, what were the dimensions of the house, how many
2		bedrooms in the house?---The house had three bedrooms.
3		There was another room used as the business office and
4		there were two living areas and a kitchen.
5		A bathroom and - - -?---A bathroom and a small ensuite, yes.
6		Was the house surrounded by verandah?---Yes, it had a verandah
7		that extended perhaps four feet all the way around the
8		house.
9		In relation to the flooring or the surface of the verandah, what
10		was that?---It was concrete tiles with six inch square
11		tiles all the way around.
12		What about the house itself?---The house was a concrete floor
13		which had slate tiles in the living area and wet areas and
14		was carpeted.
15		In relation to the construction of the house or what it was made
16		of?---It was cedar shingle with a tinned roof.
17		Had your son and daughter-in-law done a fair bit of work to the
18		house over the years?---Yes, the house was not, was in a
19		semi-dilapidated condition when it was purchased and with
20		the help of two sets of grandparents it was lovingly
21		restored to a very comfortable, very happy home, yes.
22		Just asking you a little bit about the surrounds?---Yes.
23		Was there a lawn around the house?---Yes, there was.
24		What was it like, was it a lawn in summer or green in
25		summer?---Some grasses do very well in summer, yes, but
26		there were areas of it down the front of the block that
27		were not, that went back to brown grass, yes.
28		Just in general terms, how far away from the sides of the house
29		did the lawn extend?---At one point, perhaps five metres.
30		Other points, because the house was sited on an angle it
31		was close, there wasn't much lawn on one side but up to 20
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1		metres of lawn all the way around. Towards the front, it
2		extended much further, yes.
3		What about water, were there water tanks?---Yes, there was
4		originally an underground water tank that sufficed them for
5		many years. In later years with the help of Natasha's
6		parents they extended their amount of tanks and they ended
7		up with three above ground as well as the underground tank,
8		yes.
9		In relation to - was there a generator as well?---Yes. Not at
10		first, but Robert did acquire equipment. He had a
11		generator, yes.
12		Was there a water pump?---Yes, he had a five horse power petrol
13		pump.
14		In relation to hoses and the like attached to the tanks, what
15		was the position there?---There were two fire fighting
16		hoses extending the length of the house on either side
17		attached to tanks. There was also a smaller tank and a
18		hose as well.
19		In addition to that, as of February of 2009, was there a
20		sprinkler system established at the house?---Yes, Robert
21		had just completed installing underground poly pipe and
22		with attached sprinklers that would cover all corners of
23		the house, yes.
24		Those sprinklers, were they very far away from the house?---No,
25		I would say they were only perhaps a metre from the house.
26		There may have been, I believe, some on the fence line as
27		well but I am not a hundred percent sure on the fence line
28		ones.
29		We have Google earth map. Their house was getting close to the
30		top of the ridge?---The very top of the ridge, yes. You
31		can see there that it is sited on the block on an angle.
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1		Yes. So we see the tin roof there close to where the cursor
2		is?---To the right there, there was a small garage, yes.
3		You also have produced some photographs. Before I go to that,
4		Commissioners, if I may tender the statements of Mrs Davey.
5		They are at tab 34, volume 24. It is the number commencing
6		WIT.019.001.0001 and there are two statements, one which is
7		dated 18 May 2009 and also a statement taken by police
8		which is dated 23 February 2009 and I tender those
9		statements with attachments.
10		#EXHIBIT 23 - Statements of Joan Davey.
11		MR RUSH: The first photograph, Mrs Davey, which is at 0020. It
12		is a little bit out of sequence but we will have a look at
13		that one now. Is that a photograph that Robert sent to
14		you?---Yes.
15		By telephone?---By telephone, yes.
16		Do you remember the time that he sent that?---It was about a
17		little after 3, I believe, although if I may say, I didn't
18		receive it at that time.
19		Did you want to explain that?---It was, it came to my phone and
20		I didn't have my phone with me at the time and therefore I
21		didn't see it until about a week later about four or five
22		days later that I used my phone.
23		Are you able to say where that is taken from the property?---I
24		believe it is taken from the property. On the lawn area,
25		on the side, from the side of the house, on the north side
26		I would say, yes. It came with the text, "Looking up".
27		Perhaps if we can go to 0020. I might move on and come back to
28		the photographs. We will have a look at this perhaps a bit
29		later as well. I don't think it can be brought up
30		immediately. You have mentioned that you visited the
31		family home?---Yes.
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33		Bushfires Royal Commission
1		Were you in fact due to go there on 7 February?---Yes. My
2		husband and I had planned to spend some time down there,
3		leaving home on the Saturday and we would have been there,
4		yes.
5		Because of other grandchild commitments?---Yes, I have another
6		grandchild who arrived unexpectedly so I phoned Rob to say
7		we would travel to Kinglake on the Sunday evening and stay
8		the week. He said, "That's good, we will go out during the
9		week and that will be all sweet".
10		On the occasions that you had been to the home previously, had
11		you made any observations of whether there was a fire plan
12		on the wall or somewhere?---Above the telephone in the
13		family room, yes, there was a fire plan.
14		Did you ever read it or make any observations of it?---I knew
15		that it was there and, I didn't really read it, to my
16		regret, because I thought in my mind I knew what they were
17		going to do.
18		When you say that, what did you, in your mind, think they were
19		going to do?---From the days when they first purchased the
20		property, I mentioned this, you know, situation and I just
21		said the one word, I said, "fires" and he said to me, "We
22		will be long gone. Once there is a fire, we will be gone"
23		and I took that to mean they didn't intend to try and fight
24		for the house, that their lives were important, yes.
25		Back in 2006 had you been with Rob and Natasha in Perth when
26		fires were threatening the Kinglake area?---Yes, that did
27		happen. We were over on a business trip with Robert and
28		Natasha and we got word of a fire at Kinglake and I said to
29		them, "Do you want to return home?" And Rob said, "No, we
30		are here. The pets", they had a number of dogs were in
31		kennels, and the house was insured and "we could do with
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1		new bathrooms" so he wasn't perturbed about the house.
2		Had you seen, since 7 February, a community fire guard list for
3		participating residents in the area in which Robert and
4		Natasha lived?---Yes, since the fires, I had been searching
5		for answers and reasons and during that I was in
6		communication with Robert and Natasha's friends from
7		Kinglake. I had been aware that in recent years they had
8		participated in CFA community meetings and I was quite
9		happy that they were being involved in the community but on
10		reading that current - the last fire group notes, I was
11		quite alarmed to see that it said stay. There was, I
12		think, 23 names, 23 families there and there was also a CFA
13		officer's name from the Yarra Valley. It had names,
14		addresses, number of people in the house and what fire
15		equipment they had and their intentions. It was that which
16		dismayed me because I had been speaking to Natasha on the
17		day and from our previous conversations over the years I
18		had believed it was their intention to mainly protect their
19		lives and that they had fire equipment, acquired fire
20		equipment mainly since attending these meetings.
21		In relation to the Bald Spur fire guard contact list, you say
22		that you were concerned that it said stay?---Yes.
23		There is a column, and I am referring to 0034, Commissioners,
24		there is a column at the end of that list which indicates
25		staying and there is a yes or no option in relation to it
26		and in relation to staying, for Robert and Natasha, it said
27		yes?---Yes.
28		As in stay?---The explanation of the people surviving who also
29		said they were going to stay gave me information that they
30		intended to stay until they received information on the
31		conduct of fires, if there were any, in their area.
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1		Did you have a conversation during the course of 7 February with
2		Natasha?---I did.
3		How did that come about?---We phoned on a regular basis and on
4		this particular day, I had phoned, I had heard a radio
5		report of a fire at a town that I recognised, the name of a
6		town. Warrnambool is quite some four hours away from
7		Kinglake and when we visited we went to their house and
8		sort of only had cursory information on the surrounding
9		areas but I recognised a name of a near by - - -
10		Do you recall what the name was?---Wandong.
11		I said to Natasha, "There a fire near you". She said, "It is
12		miles away, mum, it is 50 degrees outside, it is 20 degrees
13		in the house. Robert is outside preparing and priming the
14		pump. The girls are very happy inside". I could hear
15		Georgia singing the Wiggles song and Natasha said, "It is
16		50 degrees, Georgia doesn't like the heat. We could get
17		caught in a traffic jam. We could drive into a fire. We
18		will stay here until we get information." I hung up
19		believing that she was happy, they were making their
20		preparations and they were confident that it was a normal
21		day for them.
22		When you spoke to her, did you get an understanding as to
23		whether she was on the computer?---Yes, she was working.
24		She was working on the computer and she said, "I have the
25		CFA window open and I am watching for information. Rob's
26		outside, he has the radio on outside and he is wetting down
27		and making sure everything is in working order. He was
28		putting mops and buckets as well along the boundary of the
29		house." I just assumed that they were having their normal
30		day. It was very hot, it had been hot up there for some
31		eight or nine days previously and they believed - I
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1		believed they were having a normal day and being alert.
2		Did you have any other communication on 7 February?---No. We
3		talked for a while about the children, it was just that one
4		phone call. I will regret forever that I missed the
5		photographic message that Robert sent to me because I had
6		taken my grandson to the beach and I had spent the day at
7		the beach at Warrnambool and I just missed it and I regret
8		that.
9		Did you try to ring a little bit later in the day?---Yes, yes,
10		on returning home from the beach, I had heard another news
11		report. I was listening to our local station 882 3YB it
12		had a relayed news broadcast from Melbourne and it
13		mentioned a town, Flowerdale, I believe and I knew that,
14		that seemed to me to be closer so I sort of hurried home
15		and I tried to made a call but there was no response. The
16		phone just didn't answer and I thought, "Oh well, lines are
17		have dropped out or something". That was about, I suppose,
18		6.15, 6.30. I then proceeded to get dinner for the guys at
19		home and normal activities. I periodically phoned Robert's
20		mobile phone and received his answering machine which made
21		me think they were busy and I just continued until I had
22		got my grandson to bed and then turned on the computer and
23		went to the CFA website for information.
24		After making that initial phone call, is there normally an
25		answering machine?---Yes, there is normally an answering
26		machine.
27		You tried on the mobile phone?---I tried on the mobile phone and
28		I was getting the answering machine which I must explain I
29		am not familiar with mobile phones and I thought that
30		answering on a mobile would be the same as a house phone,
31		you know, that it would be that the phone was there and it
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1		would answer, I wasn't up with this message bank and I was
2		quite reassured that if the phone is okay, Robert will be
3		okay because he was never away from it.
4		Were you on any websites trying to find out what went on?---Yes,
5		I was flicking between CFA and because the radio that my
6		husband was listening to was giving also a number for the
7		Red Cross, so I flicked between CFA and Red Cross and my
8		husband was listening to the radio and the website was -
9		didn't seem to change until about, I think it was about 10
10		o'clock I noticed the first fire at Kinglake and we were
11		becoming increasingly more alarmed as time went on because
12		we couldn't get any answers and we were phoning those
13		advertised numbers, the emergency numbers that were - - -
14		Was that the Victorian bushfire line?---Yes, the bushfire
15		information line and there was also the Red Cross line for
16		information that was being broadcast. We phoned those
17		numbers continually and in actual fact we phoned those
18		numbers until 12 o'clock the next day and not one of our
19		calls were answered.
20		Did you actually hang on for quite - - -?---I actually got a
21		voice, a computerised voice message that my call was
22		important and that I should hang on so I held that line
23		simply because it was something, for almost two hours and
24		the call was never answered.
25		Do you remember which line?---It was the bushfire emergency
26		line.
27		Without any information coming through?---No, no information
28		except more anxiety because by then I think I noticed there
29		were four fires at Kinglake and they said small fires and
30		then they said - there was one that said a grass fire in
31		Bald Spur Road which spun me out completely because I am
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1		aware that there are houses in Bald Spur Road and there is
2		bush at the side. There is no grass in Kinglake and if you
3		have got a fire in Kinglake you need - you need to get the
4		heck out of there or you need somebody to put it out,
5		neither of which happened apparently.
6		What did you do on Sunday?---We drove, after observing
7		television, the radio, computer, and the phone and getting
8		no assistance except more anxious and more frustrated we
9		then, in the morning, drove to Melbourne via a niece at
10		Werribee, we stopped there for a moment but I was too
11		anxious to stop so we continued on to Whittlesea where we
12		registered the children as missing and I wrote on notes,
13		sticker notes and put them on a board, messages that, you
14		know, "Davey family, please contact us" and "Rob, where are
15		you" and "if anybody knows where Rob and Tash are", I wrote
16		our phone number on, I just sat there writing number, help,
17		and becoming increasingly more distressed because there was
18		no answers to anything.
19		Did you in fact go to Morang South at one stage?---After we had
20		registered we moved about Whittlesea to wherever we saw
21		anyone congregated. We went to CFA where we saw the trucks
22		and the orange uniforms. That was just an action point and
23		we went to the police station. We were reassured by one
24		police officer that the children's car wasn't one of the
25		ones on the road that had been crashed so it became my
26		mindset that they have made it out and they are at, there
27		was an oval, maybe at North Kinglake. I remember Robert
28		saying there is an oval near by and that would have been
29		one of the places they would have headed to if they needed
30		to get out and could go that way. If they needed to get
31		and couldn't go that way they would have gone to Diamond
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1		Creek. During the evening and the next day we travelled to
2		each of those places looking for information. The police
3		officer said she believed there would be a convoy of
4		evacuees from the mountain that would be coming down.
5		There would be 150 cars and busloads of people. So we
6		started to calm down thinking they have made it there, and
7		time was getting on, that is getting towards late in the
8		evening. We had been to South Morang and back, we had been
9		all over the area just driving and looking and searching
10		for information and it was not until we heard about that
11		convoy that we sort of started to relax a little. We
12		returned to the Whittlesea Red Cross centre and from there,
13		and during the day we had been phoning, continually phoning
14		Robert's phone. I had given up on the house phone, and
15		phoning Natasha's parents to get any information that they
16		may have had and to keep them updated where we were and
17		none of it was working and it was getting late so we sort
18		of settled at the Whittlesea centre waiting for this convoy
19		to happen and were quite devastated to hear that it had
20		been and dispersed and our children weren't anywhere to be
21		found. That was, I think we are getting towards 8, 8.30
22		and at that time I was beginning to realise that maybe I
23		wouldn't find them. So it was just a matter of settling in
24		at Whittlesea and waiting for the morning. They announced
25		there would be a meeting, an information meeting next
26		morning. Natasha's parents joined us but I had been
27		walking around the shelter and I remember standing beside a
28		gentleman as Brian Naylor's death and loss had been
29		announced and the gentleman beside me said, "Oh my God, if
30		he's gone, they will all be dead up there". I said, "What
31		do you mean?" And he said to me that, to the effect that
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1		Mr Naylor's property was eminently prepared and eminently
2		enforced to fight anything and if he hadn't been able to
3		fight the fire with his equipment he didn't believe that
4		anybody else would have been able to fight such a fire. So
5		reality was beginning to bite, I am afraid.
6		Can we go back a little bit and have a look at some of the
7		photographs?---That is the family home at the back area of
8		the house. That is prior to the tanks, the extra tanks
9		were fitted on the opposite corner. You can see there the
10		portable tank.
11		That could be moved around?---That would be moved when it was
12		empty but you can see how green the grass was there and it
13		was a large lawn area and sparsely treed but you can also
14		see the house is constructed with a tin roof and cedar
15		shingles and cedar poles.
16		Perhaps if we can have a look at 21?---Shows the neighbour's
17		property which had a border of bush line.
18		That is the back of the photograph?---Yes.
19		And it shows the green lawn area and to the left behind the
20		fence are dog yards.
21		So the boundary of the house isn't where that fence is?---No, it
22		is some perhaps five metres past that or three to five
23		metres past that but the line of trees, there was a fence
24		at the boundary and they were the neighbour's trees, yes.
25		Next photograph?---That is looking from that area where we were
26		photographed back the other way.
27		So that looks back over the road, does it?---No, that looks
28		east. You can see there that Robert and Natasha's house
29		was at the highest point of Kinglake, they were right on
30		the top of the mountain. You travelled down the road to go
31		into the village, yes.
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1		There are some more photos that we might have a look at. That
2		is a photograph of the house, obviously?---Yes, that is the
3		photograph of the house, looking at the front from the
4		west, yes.
5		The next one 0024?---You can see, that is the house from the
6		west side, is it?
7		In the front is the ride-on mower?---That is from the south side
8		and that looks - see the tall thing at the back is the
9		water cylinder and looking through there you can see the
10		neighbouring properties are all destroyed as well.
11		The next photograph at 0025?---That is the five horse power
12		petrol pump that was apparently equivalent to a water
13		pistol in the conditions.
14		The next photograph is one of the tanks?---The tanks, yes.
15		There were two tanks there, the other one is completely
16		destroyed and they were connected to pumps. I think you
17		can just see the pump at the corner there where the bit of
18		spouting has fallen. They were connected and in the "on"
19		position.
20		0027?---My son's vehicle.
21		0028?---That is the hose that was connected to the pump and it
22		is in the "on" position.
23		And then at 0029?---That shows one of the sprinklers set in the
24		corner close to the house. I believe the car removal
25		people broke the top off it.
26		0030?---That is remains of the portable tank we were looking at
27		before.
28		Were the family found in the bathroom?---The family were found
29		sheltering in the bathroom, yes.
30		And perhaps while we are looking at these matters, if you can
31		just bring up 0034.
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1		Just while that is coming up, Mrs Davey, during the
2		course of your evidence you mentioned an oval and perhaps
3		there may have been a desire to move to an oval; had that
4		been discussed with you?---It was some years prior; it was
5		just in our discussions of, you know, how would you manage
6		if there was a fire and he said, well, he expected that he
7		would find out a fire was coming their way. As I
8		understand it, in the '06 fire at Kinglake when we were
9		away, the fire truck travelled up and down the streets with
10		a siren and a loudspeaker alerting people to follow the
11		truck out if you wished to get out or activate your plan.
12		That is the information since the incident that has been
13		given to me by survivors and people who live in the area.
14		I think we might leave the screen for the moment. Mrs Davey,
15		there are some matters you wanted to particularly raise
16		with the Royal Commissioners and I know one of them
17		concerned prediction of fire?---Yes. Yes, I do. The
18		families are all very grateful to CFA volunteers and all
19		volunteers, but I just wonder how a fire that is never ever
20		under control and burning towards a populated area - I
21		understand the CFA didn't put their trucks on that side and
22		yet the people, the residents who were in that fire path
23		were - I believe from speaking to my children about their
24		communication with the CFA, that they expected, they
25		expected that CFA screen to say a warning, and that is why
26		they felt they were comfortable in their home, they were
27		safe, they felt safe and they were watching for this.
28		Whether that was agreed in their meetings - I believe it
29		was. They were active in communicating with people in the
30		area and what they would do and I believe that the people
31		on Bald Spur Road had an expectation of survival that was
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1		beyond reality. I think if a CFA person went to that hill
2		to convene meetings, they should have realised that Bald
3		Spur Road was at the highest point of Kinglake. The street
4		consisted of homes built of combustible material. Our
5		house was cedar. It was like having a house in a
6		fireplace. Yet they were encouraged to establish fireguard
7		equipment that ... unless the fire started and their
8		property was virtually worthless, somebody should have
9		recognised that Bald Spur Road was indefensible, totally
10		indefensible, and should have been - the activity of that
11		fire group to establish evacuation or warning systems that
12		would get people out of that street. Thank you.
13		One other matter that you raised in the submission that you
14		indicated you might like to raise is in relation to houses
15		and the protection that houses give people?---Yes. I
16		believe that at those meetings they were encouraged to save
17		their house- people save houses, houses can save people -
18		which was not applicable to their - maybe wonderfully
19		applicable to open plains and grasslands, but if you have a
20		ridge and you have got combustible houses, they ain't going
21		to save you, baby. There's nothing - they're not going to
22		save you.
23		You mentioned roadside vegetation?---I believe a lot of people
24		lost their life in that fire trying to escape because the
25		Kinglake area is heavily wooded and I would say that in
26		order for - if we are going to learn anything from this,
27		there must be clear access from people. Roadsides
28		shouldn't have trees that have the ability to block them.
29		I believe that trees are fine so long as they have not got
30		the ability to fall and block a road.
31		If I can just go back to one matter?---Yes, thank you.
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1		You mentioned the meetings?---Yes.
2		And Robert and Natasha's attendance at the meetings?---Yes.
3		I think it is fair to say that you don't know what was said at
4		the meetings?---I don't know what was said at the meetings.
5		I can only ascertain that their opinions changed of their
6		abilities. At first there was no intention of ever
7		contesting a fire and I believe with the acquiring of all
8		this equipment and the fact that they did die there was
9		that they gained false confidence, either in their own
10		ability, in the ability of the CFA or the combination of
11		both. If there had been a row of CFA trucks on Bald Spur
12		Road, everybody would have died there as well. It was
13		simply an indefensible street in a fire situation. And
14		prior to the activity with the CFA, our children were of a
15		mind to leave and we will lament forever that our children
16		interacted with the CFA fireguard group.
17		Just looking at that (it has come up), that's the Bald Spur Road
18		fireguard group?---And their contact numbers.
19		They are the third people mentioned?---Yes.
20		And it notes, going across the page there, the number of adults,
21		the number of children?---Yes.
22		It says four dogs; was that about right?---Unfortunately they
23		lost two dogs in close succession prior to the fires, one
24		from old age, one for another reason, yes.
25		Then it sets out the special remarks - generator fire pump,
26		hoses on all three tanks?---Yes.
27		And there were, as you have indicated, and we have seen
28		sprinklers as well?---Yes, the sprinklers are a later
29		addition, yes.
30		In relation to them on that list in relation to staying, it says
31		yes?---Yes, it does, as it does with a large number of the
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1		other people; and I might note that fifteen of them are
2		also deceased from that street.
3		Thank you.
4		MR CLELLAND: No questions, Mr Chairman.
5		CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much indeed. I understand it would
6		have been a very difficult experience, but thank you for
7		putting yourself through it.
8		COMMISSIONER PASCOE: Can I add my thanks. It is an act of
9		great courage that you have come forward to share your
10		story. Thank you?---I have complete confidence that we
11		will get a result and I have to assure you that I will be
12		following up that your recommendations are not ignored.
13		Believe me. Thank you.
14		CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mrs Davey.
15		(THE WITNESS WITHDREW)
16		MR RUSH: Call Mr Griffiths.
17		ANTHONY STEPHEN GRIFFITHS, sworn and examined:
18		CHAIRMAN: Please take a seat and make yourself as comfortable
19		as you can in the circumstances.
20		MR RUSH: Mr Griffiths, is your name Anthony Griffiths?---That's
21		right.
22		Do you work from the Department of Sustainability and
23		Environment at 8 Nicholson Street in East Melbourne?---Yes.
24		There are you the acting manager of fire and the information
25		group?---That's right, fire information and assistance
26		group.
27		Can you indicate to the Commissioners just what that management
28		role encompasses?---Yes. We have a number of business
29		information systems that comprise of a web portal called
30		FireWeb, an incident resource information system called
31		IRIS and a web mapping system called Firemap.
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1		Mr Griffiths, have you prepared a statement with a number of
2		attachments for the purposes of explaining what you do,
3		which, Commissioners, is at 23, tab 17, and the first page
4		it WIT.018.001.0001?---Yes.
5		And the contents of the statement are true and correct?---Yes,
6		correct.
7		I tender the statement with its attachments.
8		#EXHIBIT 24 - Statement of Mr A Griffiths with attachments.
9		Mr Griffiths, you mentioned as a starting point FireWeb. Can
10		you explain to us what FireWeb as run through the DSE is
11		and in very brief terms because we'll come to it in some
12		detail, just an overview of it?---Sure. The whole purpose
13		of FireWeb is to have it as our primary source of
14		integrated fire information so a lot of other systems are
15		made available via FireWeb and all our information
16		resources and incident information, for example, is stored,
17		is accessible via FireWeb.
18		You mentioned the word integrated there. Is it integrated in
19		the sense of integrating all the various sources and
20		information streams within DSE or is it integrated with
21		CFA?---It is integrated sometimes with CFA. For example,
22		we exchange our incident lists every 15 minutes between
23		organisations and they are automated to upload into the web
24		browser every 15 minutes.
25		I am going to have to ask you to try and keep your voice up a
26		little bit?---Okay.
27		So you say there is an exchange, an automatic exchange every 15
28		minutes, between what?---Between the CFA system and
29		ourselves who are managing the FireWeb system.
30		Are they different systems or the same type of system?---They
31		are different platforms. I don't know a lot of detail
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1		about the CFA system.
2		Just to go over some qualifications of yours, Mr Griffiths. Are
3		you an accredited air observer and an infrared
4		operator?---Correct.
5		And you have been a member of the Australasian Fire and
6		Emergency Services Authorities Council in relation to
7		particularly its data management group?---That's correct.
8		And the FireWeb system is internet-based?---Yes, it is available
9		via a web browser.
10		And is it available to the public or is there parts available to
11		the public and parts only to DSE?---That's correct. A lot
12		of incident detail is stored in FireWeb and we summarise
13		that information to place on the external web for
14		information that is available to the public.
15		In your statement you refer to something which you have
16		described as State Map?---Yes.
17		Is State Map capable of being brought up on the screen?---It is,
18		but it is going to take me a few minutes to log in and to
19		get it up.
20		Okay. Perhaps if you could do that?---We seem to be having a
21		bit of a problem with our external access.
22		I think it is me, Mr Griffiths?---I might just try again.
23		I don't know whether the Commissioners intend taking a break
24		this afternoon.
25		CHAIRMAN: If it is sensible to take one on account of
26		technological problems, we will take it now.
27		MR RUSH: I think it might be, sir.
28		(Short adjournment)
29		ANTHONY STEPHEN GRIFFITHS, recalled:
30		MR RUSH: Thank you, Commissioners. Mr Griffiths, what has come
31		up on the screen is State Map, but there is a lot more to
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1		it than that, I take it. Can I firstly ask you, on that
2		map are you able to put up on the screen as they might
3		develop incidents in relation to fire?---That's right; and
4		the purpose of this screen is an overview of the state. As
5		fires are reported, the icons that we can see on the map
6		there (I will just scroll down a bit to the status), you
7		can see that we have three controlled fires across the
8		state.
9		What you are showing is three controlled fires in the state at
10		the moment?---Yes.
11		Are they controlled burn fires?---They are wildfires.
12		And the information that comes up, if we log into, say, the one
13		at Cann River, if you click on that, what are we seeing
14		there?---By placing my mouse over the icon, I get some
15		basic detail about that fire. If I like to review the fire
16		report, I can click on that and it will bring up the fire
17		report. Is that what you would like to see?
18		Yes, thank you. That says the last report was
19		20 April?---That's right. That is relating to the latest
20		situation report. I believe that is so. I can scroll down
21		and find that information out. That appears to be the
22		case.
23		So what are we looking at there?---What we are looking at is the
24		incident summary. We are not getting a whole lot of
25		resolution on the screen so it is not showing a great deal.
26		So details about the fire, the status, the potential of it,
27		the location of the origin, details about our initial
28		response to the fire, some fire behaviour information,
29		resources that are deployed to it and then some incident
30		management details and the attachments such as maps may be
31		attached there, there is none at the moment, and then all
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1		the situation reports for the duration of the campaign
2		against that fire.
3		In relation to an incident such as the Murrindindi fire, how
4		would that come to be placed on State Map?---The procedure
5		that we have in place is either a district duty officer or
6		if an incident management team has been established, they
7		will fill out a form, a hardcopy form, and fax it into the
8		ECT where a duty officer will enter that into FireWeb. We
9		are also trialling direct input into the system from the
10		incident management teams themselves. I am not sure about
11		who is involved in that, but there is a number of
12		participating fire districts.
13		I will come to that. When we look at State Map, we have just
14		looked at the fire of Cann River, just getting an overview
15		of what it offers. Are you also able to look at aircraft
16		movements on State Map?---That's right. If I go back to
17		State Map, there is a number of tabs there across the top
18		of the screen of which are labelled burns, so all our
19		prescribed burning.
20		Aircraft movement. If I click on aircraft, I will
21		see ... there is not a lot of aircraft on contract at the
22		moment so there is four aircraft being displayed there.
23		They are all yellow; that shows that we haven't received an
24		observation from those resources within the last hour.
25		So they change colour if you have received an observation from
26		the aircraft in the last hour?---That's right, they will
27		turn red; a red icon will be displayed.
28		And you mentioned before planned burning. Does the State Map
29		indicate where planned burning is taking place or where it
30		is proposed to be taking place?---Yes. This is our burn
31		map at the moment. It is showing all statuses as is down
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1		the bottom there. We also have the feature of being able
2		to select whatever status you want displayed. The ignition
3		symbols are showing the burns that are being ignited today.
4		So when you say ignition signals, they are in red and you are
5		pointing there with the cursor?---That's right, to the
6		flame symbol.
7		COMMISSIONER MCLEOD: Excuse me, can you show those just on one
8		day, today for example?---Yes, sure. If I press on just
9		ignition and click on update, I just see - - -
10		So that is a daily view?---Yes, that's right.
11		A current view?---Yes.
12		Thank you.
13		MR RUSH: What was the other information that was depicted on
14		the map? There were lots of dots all over the map?---They
15		are different statuses of our prescribed burns, so as a
16		prescribed burn is being planned through to being ignited
17		and then through to completed and safe status.
18		At a later time in the Royal Commission's hearings, but it may
19		be relevant to ask you this now, are you able to bring up
20		where prescribed burns have taken place, for instance in
21		the last 2 or 3 years?---Yes, I can do that, yeah, from our
22		fire history database and using our Firemap web service.
23		What about weather in relation to State Map?---Yes, we download
24		a lot of weather products from the Bureau of Meteorology.
25		We also include some products from other sources such as
26		Weatherzone and create some ourselves. For instance, we
27		have a service of a lightning feed coming from a company
28		called GPATS and we produce our own maps of putting their
29		lightning observations over a map of Victoria.
30		I will have a look at that in a little bit more detail, but just
31		in relation to aircraft you say none have reported in the
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1		last hour. Are there GPS tracking devices in the
2		aircraft?---Yes, that's right.
3		Are you able to track the movements of the aircraft on any
4		particular day?---Yes. The interval that is set in each
5		aircraft is to send a position between every 60 and 120
6		seconds, so we can see where the aircraft are.
7		So for rotary-wing aircraft that may be fighting a perimeter of
8		a fire, are you able to observe the movements of that
9		aircraft?---Yes, at least to, you know, every 2 minutes.
10		How is that information used?---It is used in a number of
11		different ways, depending on the role you are undertaking
12		in the incident management team and, for instance, anyone
13		involved in aircraft management may be just viewing that
14		the aircraft is still operating and they can see that it is
15		moving. And the information that is displayed when you
16		hover your mouse over the aircraft indicates the speed and
17		direction that the aircraft is moving in.
18		Similarly, in relation to tankers or bulldozers that may be used
19		by DSE, are you able to track that equipment?---That's
20		right. We have had a policy for a while where we have
21		fitted the GPS devices to all our track dozers and our fire
22		tanker fleet.
23		So in relation to that, are you able to follow where a
24		containment line might have been attempted or things of a
25		similar nature in relation to firefighting capacity?---We
26		can certainly imply that. If we speak to the incident
27		management team and we are made aware, for example, where a
28		bulldozer is involved in construction of a control line, it
29		will be sending its position back every 10 minutes and we
30		can certainly assume that where it's been is where the
31		control line has been constructed.
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1		What we have got up there is weather. Does the weather
2		information come to you from the Bureau of
3		Meteorology?---That's right. Some weather products and the
4		ones within the fire weather area there on the screen are
5		principally available to just the fire agencies, so the
6		outlook, for example, and significant weather charts, but
7		we also get standard weather products such as weather
8		observations across the state and in adjoining states.
9		So can you show us or demonstrate how ... I will come back to
10		what I was going to ask you - will you demonstrate how a
11		person, using this tool, might be able to go to a
12		particular area, let's say Kilmore, and find out what the
13		weather is in Kilmore?---Sure. I will show you the
14		observation maps. We have got an observation map here of
15		Victoria which shows the current observation from the
16		automatic weather stations and the bureau create this
17		product and make it available to DSE via their file
18		transfer site.
19		So what are we looking at on that map?---So this is showing -
20		let's have a look - it has got relative humidity in the
21		actual values there and it is showing wind direction and
22		speed and temperature in the colour as well, so we can see
23		there the black areas are below 15°, the blue, 15 to 20,
24		and the green, 15 to 25.
25		If we wanted to look at a specific site in relation to
26		weather?---If we want to inquire of a specific site, we can
27		go back to State Map and choose the weather tab and we get
28		a view of all the automatic weather stations across the
29		state. Also if we deploy a portable automatic weather
30		station, that will appear on the State Map as well and
31		something close to Kilmore is Redesdale and so we hover our
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1		mouse over it and find out the detail about that station.
2		So that is the current weather position for Redesdale as of 3.45
3		today?---The current time on there is 1530. I think they
4		report every 30 minutes.
5		Mr Griffiths, in relation to this information on a day like
6		7 February, who is it available to?---It is available to
7		all of DSE and its now partners and also we provide access
8		into the CFA network as well.
9		I think you say in your statement that you were in effect
10		seconded to the IECC for the fire season?---Yeah, we can
11		volunteer to fulfil a fire role within the IECC and within
12		incident management teams.
13		What was your role this fire season?---One of the roles was fire
14		systems support duty officer, which I undertook quite a
15		lot.
16		And so within the IECC this information is available by anyone
17		who wants to access it through the DSE system using the
18		web?---Correct.
19		But for the public, is this sort of information available or is
20		it more limited?---It is more limited. We show the
21		location of fires and the prescribed burning and we also
22		put updates, fire updates, on the external web.
23		What the Commission has heard over the course of its hearings is
24		that there may be a fire over which DSE is the controller
25		and a fire over which CFA is the controller. This is the
26		DSE website. How does a CFA fire get into this information
27		stream if it does?---My understanding is if it is a CFA
28		incident where there is no DSE personnel involved, it
29		possibly won't get put into our system because it is
30		managed solely by the other organisation. In a joint
31		managed incident, it will appear in our system and in the
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1		CFA system.
2		And you, as you have indicated, can't comment or are not aware
3		of whether CFA have a similar capacity - as we are looking
4		at your DSEs, whether CFA have this similar capacity?---I
5		am aware they have an incident management system, but I am
6		not aware of any other detail of it. I am assuming they do
7		have a fire reporting system.
8		Can I ask you this, then. If there is a CFA controlled fire,
9		how does that get onto the DSE website which is available
10		to the public; and vice versa, how does a DSE fire which is
11		controlled by the DSE get onto the CFA website which is
12		accessible to the public?---That is getting into an area
13		where I'm not really qualified. You know, I don't work in
14		any roles that exchange information between organisations.
15		The decision would be made by other roles.
16		Then I take it you can only say what gets onto the DSE
17		website?---Yes, that's what I can see.
18		And you have expressed the view that you are in some doubt as to
19		whether a CFA controlled fire may make it onto the DSE
20		website?---If I can take you to the fires page, our fire
21		reporting page, I indicated before that we exchange fire
22		information every 15 minutes. I have got a link there that
23		shows the list that the CFA have just sent to us, so we can
24		see there that it is dated 1545, today's date and that's
25		the list of CFA incidents at the moment.
26		So that is updated every 15 minutes?---That's right.
27		And does that go on to your map?---No, not necessarily.
28		And does it go onto the map that is available to the
29		public?---No. We don't have any - there's no location
30		information in the detail that they send to us.
31		Are you able to bring up past fire events on the screen?
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1		---That's right, yes.
2		So if we wanted to go and have a look at the Murrindindi fire or
3		the Beechworth fire or a linescan that was taken on
4		7 February, it is capable of - it is kept in the history,
5		if you like, of this system?---That's right. All that
6		information is stored for later use and possible use by
7		wildfire investigators, for example.
8		Before I ask you to move there, the weather bureau, just
9		finishing off on the weather, I think you have indicated
10		that is automatically fed through to your system from the
11		weather bureau?---The weather bureau places it on their
12		file transfer site and yes, we have an automatic job that
13		looks at that site, so every - I'm not sure what the
14		interval is, it might be every ten minutes and downloads
15		new weather products that are placed there.
16		Can I ask you some questions about how an incident is
17		reported?---Sure.
18		For it to appear on State Map as a fire incident, what is the
19		mechanism of reporting?---As I understand it, the procedure
20		is once a fire is reported to DSE, within 15 minutes a fire
21		report should be submitted.
22		And what is the fire report and who submits it?---If the fire is
23		reported to a local fire district, then the district duty
24		officer will either fill out the hardcopy form and fax that
25		into the integrated emergency coordination centre, or if
26		they have been trained and they have the correct
27		registration, they can do it themselves.
28		So they can either fax it through - to where?---To the IECC.
29		Or if they have been trained, they can go direct into the system
30		and put it on the system themselves?---Correct.
31		That takes place at the incident control centre that is a DSE
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1		incident control centre?---Yes, it can be an incident
2		control centre or if an incident management team hasn't
3		been set up yet, it would be the district duty officer that
4		would be undertaking that task.
5		Then once it is on the system as an incident, how is the fire
6		mapped, how does DSE keep track of the fire?---As incident
7		information becomes available it will be - it is the
8		responsibility of the planning section within an incident
9		management team, and information can be collected by roles
10		such as an air observer and a ground observer, and that
11		information passed on back to the incident management team
12		and the mapping officer can interpret that information and
13		create a map.
14		So is that information interpreted by the incident control
15		centre, or is it interpreted and placed in the system at
16		the IECC?---It can be done at either, but in the IECC we do
17		have mapping experts as part of my team, and if the
18		incident is in the progress of being established, or the
19		incident management team being established, then we can
20		assist while it is being established by helping out with
21		some mapping services.
22		You indicated in answer to that question that you have a team of
23		experts in relation to mapping at the IECC. Having regard
24		to your answer that that is done at the incident control
25		centre - that mapping, once established, what is the role
26		of the expert mappers at the IECC over the course of a day
27		like the 7th February?---Like the 7th February, they may
28		need to create products for the IECC itself, or they are
29		there to support the incident management teams.
30		So what sort of products are created for the IECC itself?---It
31		may be the statewide overview map, which is one of the
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1		standard products that can be produced from the Firemap. I
2		haven't worked in the mapping unit this summer, so I am
3		unaware of any other product.
4		Can I ask you about linescan, and it is a qualification that you
5		have. Are you able to produce for us from the data on the
6		system the linescan that was taken of the East Kilmore fire
7		at 12.33 on 7 February?---Sure, I can do that, yes. I will
8		just open up our Firemap site and I will zoom in to that
9		area. Okay, so I've loaded there a scan from the 7th
10		of February, and I can only display one at a time but that
11		is looking like - actually, I've made a mistake, that was
12		from the 8th. I can load from the 7th at 12.33. Just a
13		moment. Thank you. That has loaded the scan. If I zoom
14		in further I will start to see some more detail.
15		Firstly, perhaps you can explain it to us. We see the
16		semi-cigar shape in red, and then behind it what looks like
17		red and white dots. You are experienced as a linescan
18		operator, are you able to describe what is depicted
19		there?---That's right, it is an infrared image. Infrared
20		is able to see through smoke. When an infrared image is
21		showing colours that are dark as cool surface temperature,
22		through to colours that are very hot, as white on the
23		screen, and we also are able within our firescan system to
24		set a threshold where temperatures over a certain threshold
25		that we set, and, for example, 70 degrees celsius will be
26		colourised, and that is the red area that we can see in the
27		centre of the screen, and that's the active area of the
28		fire at the moment.
29		So the red area is the active area of the fire, and then back
30		towards the right in Kilmore East there appear to be some
31		areas of red and what looks like white?---That's right. So
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1		looking at that, the fire has started from the north and
2		has travelled in a southerly direction.
3		That is taken by an aircraft?---Yes.
4		From an aircraft?---Yes, that's right. Our firescan system
5		comprises of equipment fitted in the aircraft. As the
6		aircraft moves forward and we turn on the scanner, it scans
7		left and right as it passes over the landscape, and we
8		create two products, a QuickPrint, which is being created
9		as it flies, and once the scan is completed, we create a
10		georectified image, where the location of the scan is
11		corrected so that it can be automatically loaded within web
12		mapping applications like Firemap.
13		For the QuickPrint, how long does that take, once you have
14		scanned the fire?---I believe it is being created as the
15		data is being captured. So, it is available in A4 sheets,
16		and as there is enough data available for one A4 sheet, it
17		will create that A4 product and then start creating p.2.
18		In general terms, if I was to ask for a QuickPrint of the 12.33
19		linescan, how long would it take to produce it?---From when
20		the scan starts, probably up to five minutes.
21		In relation to what you called the georectified image, how long
22		does that take?---An additional five minutes, say ten
23		minutes.
24		Is that transmitted from the aircraft?---Yes, that's right. We
25		have a network of downlink sites across Victoria and once
26		we are in range of one of those downlink sites, we are able
27		to transmit the products into our network and make them
28		available on our systems.
29		So, again, in general terms for the QuickPrint and then the
30		georectified image, can it be anticipated that such imagery
31		will be made available within 10 or 15 minutes of the
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1		linescan taking place?---Correct.
2		Who receives that imagery on a day like the 7th February?---We
3		have a part of FireWeb that is a firescan request page, so
4		planning officers within the incident management teams can
5		actually place a request. That request is then managed by
6		the State Aircraft Unit who will create a mission and put
7		staff to actually go and capture that information, and then
8		once it is scanned it will be transmitted back into our
9		systems, and the planning officer will then go to a similar
10		page where that information is delivered, or it comes
11		straight into Firemap and they can view it.
12		Within the IECC, once created the QuickPrint and the
13		georectified image, who takes control of it in the
14		IECC?---I don't think anyone takes control of it, but it is
15		available for everyone to view.
16		How is it available for everyone to view?---Meaning I'm able to
17		view it in Firemap. Everyone else that can access Firemap
18		that's on our network, or the NEO network or the CFA
19		network can view it the same way.
20		In relation to the integrated emergency centre, coordination
21		centre, does it only appear on the DSE website, something
22		like this, or will it appear on the CFA as well?---It
23		appears within the CFA network as well, and the CFA prior
24		to this fire season committed to using Firemap for all
25		mapping incidents during this season.
26		Again, within general terms, accepting that linescan at 12.33,
27		one can anticipate that by 12.45 the information on that
28		linescan was available at the IECC. What about the
29		incident control centre?---They, yes, access the systems
30		the same way, it is exactly the same thing, so as soon as
31		it is available on the system they will be able to view it
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1		as well.
2		Whilst you were bringing up the linescan, I noticed a number of
3		information bars in relation to mapping that are available
4		for maps. Could you perhaps just quickly detail to the
5		Commissioners the availability - what is available, what
6		sort of information?---Sure. There's a mixture of static
7		information. Static is information that doesn't change
8		that often. For example, infrastructure such as location
9		of airfields, fire towers and operation points. Vegetation
10		information, mainly on public land, which shows, you know,
11		the type of vegetation that will affect fire behaviour,
12		therefore, that's available there. I will just close that.
13		Cultural and heritage feature information. The ability to
14		turn on contours and more detailed road network, for
15		example. We also include realtime information. For
16		example, our resource and aircraft tracking system
17		observations can be viewed within Firemap.
18		So, just as an example, for 7 February, or some other convenient
19		date, are you able to detail to us what aircraft movements
20		were over the fire on 7 February?---I can't do it from
21		here, because we set up the systems to show current
22		information, but I can find that out for you back in the
23		office.
24		It wasn't done for that purpose, but if we were to look at
25		aircraft movements today over this region, are you able to
26		bring that up?---Yes, sure. If I can zoom back out to the
27		state level and turn on the locations of fixed wing
28		aircraft and helicopters, and we get to see a fair bit more
29		than the State Map.
30		So has there been aircraft movements in and around the Melbourne
31		area today?---I can't see any red aircraft on there, so it
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1		doesn't look like there is a lot of movements at the moment
2		- within the last hour.
3		Are you able to bring up topographical features of particular
4		areas on State Map?---On State Map or Firemap?
5		On Firemap?---Yes, I am. When I start zooming in I get access
6		to more and more detail, and to illustrate that I will just
7		zoom in for a while. So I am zoomed in at the moment at a
8		scale of 1 as to 338,000. If I zoom in even further I get
9		more and more stream work information displayed, for
10		example. If I want to turn on some more layers, I choose
11		what appears on the map. So I'm seeing local track
12		networks and I am zoomed into 1 as to 33,000 now, so it is
13		very detailed data.
14		Without going into every detail, you are also able to keep track
15		of resources on any particular day, and I mean by that,
16		tankers, bulldozers and the like?---Yes, that's right.
17		Individual tankers and the like?---Yes, if I move back up here
18		to the RAAF's folder - I have only turned on helicopters
19		and fixed wing aircraft - I can view the locations and
20		their trails - where they have been for the day, is what I
21		mean by trails. If I turn all those on and zoom back out
22		to the state level we get a picture of where our high value
23		resources are at the moment. The black lines you can see
24		there is where they have travelled during today.
25		Can you bring up what you are just pointing to there?---Yes, I
26		can zoom in a bit further.
27		What are we looking at?---We are possibly looking at here the
28		track that the fire spotter 368 there on the screen has
29		taken during - earlier today. I am able to find out more
30		information by selecting the information icon and clicking
31		on it and I can see that the fixed wing aircraft moved at
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1		8.23 am this morning.
2		Thank you. I am going to quicken it up a little bit,
3		Mr Griffiths. Is there any other feature of this
4		particular aspect that you think it is worthwhile taking
5		the Commissioners to?---We have been viewing lots of
6		information. We also train our mapping officers to be able
7		to add incident information into Firemap as well. So we
8		have a number of tools across the top of the page here.
9		The fire sketcher tools which I am selecting now is
10		available to authenticated individuals who have received
11		training and are competent in mapping fires.
12		In relation to, for example, persons that were working in the
13		IECC on 7 February in relation to fire analysis and
14		prediction, they can build up maps from this system in
15		relation to their work?---That's right. At the moment
16		another feature of Firemap, after you collect your data and
17		save it within the system, is you can access templates of
18		standard maps. At the moment it is a development project
19		to add prediction maps in as a standard template. So we
20		don't have it at the moment, but we will be working on it.
21		What do you mean add them in as a standard template?---Okay. If
22		I click on the print icon there, we can see that there's a
23		number of standard wildfire map templates, and we talk with
24		our operations personnel and figure out what types of maps
25		they listen to, what types of map they need, and then
26		create a template so that if you are at a fire, for
27		instance, in Mildura, and you receive a map, it has exactly
28		the same symbology and has the same look and feel as the
29		fire you attended in Cann River, for example. So it is
30		standardising the look of the map and the detail that is
31		included on the map.
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1		COMMISSIONER PASCOE: Mr Rush, could I ask a question for a
2		matter of clarification. When we had Deputy Commissioner
3		Kieran Walshe here this morning, he spoke about the
4		Victoria Police monitoring a project that the Western
5		Australian police have looking at the aims of ICS and the
6		capacity to upload data during an incident. What I am
7		wondering is, with this system, at the level of the
8		incident control centre, would it be possible for people to
9		input information so that it would be directly available to
10		the IECC, and then theoretically almost immediately
11		available to be uploaded to the CFA and DSE
12		websites?---That's right, that's what I meant by the fire
13		sketcher tools. The trained personnel are able to add that
14		incident information in, and what I mean by incident
15		information is fire area information, control lines that
16		are being constructed as well. If we need to sectorise and
17		show the incident broken up into sectors and divisions, we
18		can add all that information. As soon as that is saved it
19		is available to all other users. Everyone that can access
20		Firemap can view the detail in it, but only certain people
21		that are trained can actually add the detail into it.
22		Are you aware if there are trained people at the level of the
23		incident control centre?---Yes, there's people trained
24		throughout the state.
25		Okay?---That are able to do it.
26		Are you aware if they were inputting the data on
27		7 February?---Yes.
28		We have heard of some gaps, then, in uploading to the CFA and
29		DSE websites; do you have any sense of what might have
30		caused those gaps?---I manage, I'm responsible for the
31		internal business information systems. Yes, we do push
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1		some information on to the external web, but the external
2		web is actually managed by a service provider to the
3		Victorian Government. Also the movement of information on
4		to that website is managed by the information unit within
5		the IECC to my understanding.
6		So from the point of inputting the information which is broadly
7		available to members of the IECC, there's a further step
8		before it is then publicly available on websites?---Yes.
9		The information that stored in Firemap, one of the standard
10		map products is a media map and that would be produced,
11		including the full extent of the fire and then that PDF map
12		placed on the external web for the public to access.
13		Okay. Thank you.
14		MR RUSH: Mr Griffiths, the way in which this is managed and the
15		information it contains is only as good as the information
16		that is coming from the fire ground?---That's right. It is
17		the people at the fire ground who are providing that
18		information.
19		IRIS is another system that I would ask you to briefly turn to
20		that you mentioned in your statement. What does the
21		acronym stand for?---It is Incident Resource Information
22		Systems and it is the system that we use to keep track of
23		our resources during a deployment to an incident.
24		In saying that are you able to keep track of individual vehicles
25		or tankers or dozers and personnel?---That's right. We
26		track personnel, also equipment and vehicles. We are able
27		to dispatch them to incidents and then within the incident
28		they are deployed to a sector within the incident.
29		And from the system are you able to - if you need to put
30		together a team, does it show the qualifications of persons
31		who are available so that you can put together a particular
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1		team of people where necessary?---That's right. We have
2		business rules in place that reflects all our standard
3		crews and incident management team standard templates and
4		we put business rules in place that if you need a certain
5		qualification or medical or fitness standard to fulfil one
6		of those roles, that is recorded as a business rule, and
7		when you drag and drop a resource into that role, it does
8		check whether that resource is capable of undertaking that
9		role.
10		So, for example, if you needed a level 3 incident controller at
11		Alexandra at 4 o'clock in the afternoon of Saturday
12		7 February, you are able to bring that up on your
13		information as to who is available?---Yes. I can search
14		for resources of a certain capability, for example, and the
15		capability we would be looking for is those that have level
16		3 incident controller accreditation.
17		And it shows you the accreditation of the incident controller
18		that is on duty at any particular time, I take it?---Yes.
19		As I have just explained, once you deploy someone, drop
20		them into a role, the system checks what qualifications
21		that person has and checks against the requirements for
22		that role. It will - if the person doesn't meet the
23		requirements, it visually is represented on the screen.
24		You refer in your statement to - I'm going to a different area,
25		but you refer to what is called Sentinel hotspots which, as
26		I understand it, are hotspots that are demonstrated by
27		infrared technology, but this time taken from
28		satellites?---Yes. There's a MODIS program and a website
29		that is managed by Geoscience Australia in Canberra and
30		they are able to compare previous images to the current
31		image and determine surface temperature and then make an
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1		assumption that a fire has been ignited.
2		Just to get a bit of background to that, you mentioned
3		Geoscience Australia is the facility that they operate
4		based in or near Alice Springs?---Yes, that's right. It is
5		the MODIS satellite, which is an American satellite which
6		we get two passes during daylight hours per day and there
7		is a downlink site which Geoscience Australia manages at
8		Alice Springs, so the data is able to be downloaded from
9		the satellite, processed by Geoscience Australia and they
10		create some spatial information, a spatial file showing the
11		locations of fire ignitions.
12		And so in a similar way to what we have seen with the linescan,
13		and I say similar advisedly, is that able to reproduce on a
14		map a hotspot of where a fire is?---That's right, and we do
15		use that during an incident. If information from the
16		incident is getting hard to get, we can use the Sentinel
17		hotspots as information to make available to the incident
18		management team.
19		And you say that the satellite to your knowledge does two passes
20		a day?---Yes. There's an Aqua and Terra satellite, I
21		believe they are called, and one will pass during the
22		morning and the other one during the afternoon.
23		Was there any information from those passes passed through to
24		the system on 7 February?---Yes, we are continually
25		downloading data from the Sentinel website and it is
26		available within Firemap.
27		Can we have a look what was available from the passes on
28		7 February?---We can. But I did explain before that their
29		Firemap is showing current information. I can find that
30		information out, but it is just going to take me a bit of
31		time. I would rather do that back in the office. But maps
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1		that were produced on the day would possibly have them on.
2		I think in my statement, in appendicis there is at least
3		one map in there that has the hotspots.
4		I might find that while we are going through it, someone can. I
5		didn't pick it up, Mr Griffiths. Is that the only
6		satellite technology that is used by DSE, at least?---We
7		can purchase satellite imagery from SPOT satellite, for
8		example, a French satellite. We do have our own firescan
9		that we can deploy. So, yes, from suppliers. We don't
10		have any other access to satellite information. The MODIS
11		satellite imagery is made available via a NASA website, and
12		we do continually download that and make that available via
13		the mapping section in FireWeb. So if I click on the MODIS
14		tab in the mapping section there I see up-to-date imagery
15		for the last two days, for today and yesterday, and there
16		is also a history there, so we can go back in time and see
17		the historical - - -
18		We have seen the benefit of a linescan. Is the satellite
19		imagery able to produce something that is similar to
20		that?---The satellite imagery generally takes longer to be
21		processed, whereas the feature of linescan is the
22		timeliness of the acquisition of this information.
23		But is the end result something that is similar to the
24		linescan?---In regard to the MODIS data?
25		No, we saw a map with the linescan of the fire at East Kilmore.
26		Once the satellite information has been processed is it
27		capable of giving an outline similar to a linescan?---I'm
28		not aware of any infrared or commercial infrared satellite
29		products. Generally you get a visual satellite image, so
30		if there is a going fire you will see a lot of smoke.
31		At para.31 of your statement you indicated that the Sentinel
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1		hotspots produce data - I am reading from the fourth line:
2		"The data is processed to create a surface temperature
3		image known as MOD 14 and algorithms are used to produce a
4		thermal image". My query is for that thermal imaging, does
5		cloud matter, or smoke matter?---Yes, I don't know the
6		intimate details of how they do that processing, but we
7		tend to get - you are correct in that infrared can't see
8		through water vapour, so if there is cloud over a fire
9		area, we can't - or low cloud in particular, we can't use
10		the firescan.
11		It says "locations of high temperature are identified and
12		extracted from the image into a small text file transmitted
13		in Alice Springs", and I will try to shorten this. Is
14		there someone from DSE who can tell us just how this
15		works?---I've tried to do that in my statement, yes.
16		What I am suggesting from your statement is that if it is cloudy
17		or smoky, if the satellite is picking up thermal imaging
18		and temperature, that the cloud and smoke, except if there
19		is water vapour, shouldn't get in the road of that
20		imaging?---Yes, I'm not aware of the limitations of that
21		product. I think we would need to ask Geoscience
22		Australia.
23		Thank you.
24		COMMISSIONER MCLEOD: But wouldn't you, using that data, gain a
25		familiarity with the data?---Yes, we do, and in instances
26		where the fire is moving rapidly, it is a going incident,
27		from my experience the Sentinel hotspots can provide a good
28		overview, if it is a large fire, of where the activity of
29		the fire is at the time that the satellite passed over the
30		area. So it is able to see through the smoke if there is a
31		lot of smoke generated from it. But I'm not sure how they
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1		work that out, meaning they may interpret the existence of
2		smoke as that it is actually burning underneath, but I'm
3		not sure.
4		MR RUSH: Will you be able to provide to the Royal Commission
5		copies of the passes that were made on 7 February?---Yes.
6		If I can quickly go to other technology that you have referred
7		to in your statement. One is the SPARC EyeFi system which
8		we will see in the Royal Commission tomorrow. You refer to
9		it at p.15 of your statement. But perhaps if I can lead
10		you on this, Mr Griffiths. This was a pilot program that
11		was established, from an operational sense, just prior to
12		7 February 2009?---It was a research and development
13		project that I had a small role within, and my role was to
14		facilitate contact with tower operators for the EyeFi
15		equipment to be, or discussions to take place for the
16		equipment to be fitted on those towers.
17		And your own personal computer was downloaded with the necessary
18		software to be able to use the cameras that were installed
19		at some of the spotter towers in areas where there was fire
20		on 7 February?---Yes. Simon Langdon visited my workplace
21		in mid-December. We tried installing his client's software
22		on a DSE computer and we couldn't access his map service
23		and the site, which is the site where you can view the
24		camera feed, the video feed. But I was able to use a
25		separate laptop on a separate wireless network to access
26		that map service.
27		And so you were able to view through the cameras that were
28		installed late in the afternoon of 7 February the fire, or
29		some of the fires that were under way?---Yes, Simon sent me
30		several emails late in the afternoon with some screen shots
31		of what he was seeing on the EyeFi SPARC map surface.
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1		You say at 1800 on 7 February you were able to see the East Port
2		Phillip fire 51. Which fire was that?---Yes. It was what
3		I assumed was the East Port Phillip fire 51, which was in
4		the Melbourne catchment area to the east of Healesville,
5		and Simon sent me a screen grab showing the camera picture,
6		showing smoke on it, and a coordinate that I was able to
7		look on Firemap and determine it was very close to where a
8		fire had been reported, which was the East Port Phillip
9		fire 51.
10		You also referred to a German smoke detection system, that there
11		was, I think, a FIRE-Watch system which was trialled at DSE
12		in a very limited way in 2006?---There was - it was
13		actually 2003, we had a demonstration within our East
14		Melbourne offices, and yes, a smoke detection system,
15		that's right.
16		And it was demonstrated, but that's where it was left?--- There
17		was a power-point presentation. There was no physical
18		equipment brought to the office. So we were able to see
19		the presentation about how the cameras were used in Germany
20		and we were told during that demonstration that some
21		colleagues in Canada were preparing to conduct an
22		evaluation of that system over their summer in 2003.
23		And that evaluation has been conducted by Canadian Forest
24		Engineering Research Group?---Correct.
25		And from the detail that you provided in your statement, it is
26		an evaluation that continued over two years, over two
27		seasons?---The evaluation I believed continued over one
28		season. They were evaluating two commercial products.
29		FIRE-Watch was one of them. ForestWatch was another
30		commercial product that was available. They also trialled
31		a manually operated camera from a tower as well.
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1		The system in very basic terms works, does it, on the idea of
2		taking two images a number of minutes apart and then the
3		technology automatically compares those images to see if
4		there is any distortion from one to the other?---Correct,
5		and then if there is, an alarm is triggered.
6		And if there is, an alarm is automatically triggered?---Which
7		will notify an operator that is monitoring that video feed.
8		The evaluations that you have provided us with, certainly in
9		relation to the latter system, the ForestWatch Wildfire
10		Smoke Detection System, reached conclusions that it was
11		effective?---They did operationally trial ForestWatch for a
12		number of years, but I am unaware whether it is still in
13		use today.
14		But in relation to what it set out to do, which was to pick
15		smoke, it was reasonably effective?---The reports there
16		document the number of false alarms that were triggered.
17		They do say in the report that a lot of their man towers
18		were becoming due for renewal, or to be reconstructed, and
19		so they were looking for different options to constructing
20		a tower for a human being to be placed in, so they were
21		placing cameras on towers constructed just for cameras,
22		that a person could not inhabit.
23		I guess it is there for us all to read, but the system met the
24		standards of Alberta and Saskatchewan in relation to the
25		detection of smoke and it also was a system that not only
26		worked during the daytime but had infrared technology to
27		work in the night-time?---Yes, it states that in here.
28		As far as you are aware, there has been no other follow up from
29		DSE in relation to the system?---No. Well, ForestWatch we
30		didn't get a demonstration of but it would not have been my
31		decision to implement such a system, it would have been the
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1		- - -
2		I understand. That's the same with the trial in relation to
3		EyeFi technology?---Yes. As far as I know, we have a minor
4		part in that project and I think the research and
5		development project is to operationally or to technically
6		prove that it is feasible to set up the cameras and to
7		transmit the data.
8		Thank you. I have no further questions.
9		CHAIRMAN: Are there any questions?
10		MS BUTTON: There will be some questions from the State but if
11		any other parties wish to ask questions, we can follow up
12		at the end.
13		CHAIRMAN: I suppose it is really a matter of, if there are no
14		questions we can excuse the witness.
15		MR FARRANDS: Can I indicate, Mr Chairman, it is likely that we
16		may have questions tomorrow morning.
17		CHAIRMAN: Well, it is prudent to err on the side of caution and
18		have the witness available tomorrow morning at 9.30.
19		MR FARRANDS: We would be grateful.
20		CHAIRMAN: I think in the circumstances that is what we will do.
21		MR RUSH: Sir, could I ask, if Mr Griffiths is coming back, that
22		he bring the Geoscience Sentinel material with him
23		tomorrow?---I can try.
24		MS MCLEOD: We need to have a discussion with counsel assisting
25		about the production of those documents and we will try and
26		do that tonight.
27		CHAIRMAN: Yes, all right. We will adjourn now until 9.30.
28		(THE WITNESS WITHDREW)
29		ADJOURNED UNTIL WEDNESDAY 20 MAY 2009
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